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INTERNACIONAL
SIMULAÇÃO DE ORGANIZAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL - 1979**

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ABSTRACT

Through an exploration of these distinct yet interconnected themes, delegates will gain a deeper understanding of the complexities of state sovereignty, intervention, and the delicate balance of power, enabling them to formulate well-supported arguments and resolutions within the MUN framework. This guide emphasizes the importance of credible sourcing and provides examples of appropriate citation methodologies for both historical events and contemporary geopolitical analyses. This study's main intent is to provide an insightful understanding to participating delegates of the 24th Edition of the Simulation of International Organizations (SOI) by giving perspective on what topics the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) historical edition agenda consists of. The present compilation brings a reflective outlook on long lasting consequences of the Cold War and adjacent conflicts such as the Soviet-Afghan war undertaken on hindering the presence of covert espionage operations and the United Nations role in the maintenance of peace. Firstly, the exploration of the complexities of state sovereignty intervention and balancing power within intelligence operations as a necessary tool for State compliance in a period of influential political outcomes, followed by an overview on tactical measures adopted by the Soviet Union, the United States and neighboring countries in the conflict to reestablish freedom of government in Afghanistan by rightful standards. In order to achieve reliable results a foundation was created off of official documents, trusted unbiased literature, declassified sources and varied journalistic archives. Ultimately, a reflective scenario regarding landmarks on human rights, outlining civil, political, economic, social, and cultural changes in the last years of the 20th century was taken into consideration as for delegation's official stances and national resulting pursuits, indicating whirlwind positions through which collective actions are affected by international chain reactions.

Keywords: Security Council, Espionage, Covert operations, Cold War, Soviet-Afghan war.

ABBREVIATIONS LIST

BCE - Before the Common Era
BND - *Bundesnachrichtendienst*
CDSA - Central Intelligence Department
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
COPEI - Christian Democratic Party
CPP - Chinese Communist Party
DDR - Deutsche Demokratische Republik
DGI - Dirección General de Inteligencia
DINA - *Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional*
DISIP-*Dirección de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevención*
DRA - Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
FALN - *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional*
FNLA - National Liberation Front of Angola
GDR - German Democratic Republic
GID - General Intelligence Directorate
GRU - *Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye* (Main Intelligence Directorate)
HVA - Main Administration for Foreign Intelligence (*Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung*)
IB - Intelligence Bureau
ISI - Inter-Services Intelligence
KGB - *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* (Committee for State Security)
KhAD - *Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati* (State Intelligence Agency)
KMT - Kuomintang
KOS - Counterintelligence Service
MAH - Milli Emniyet Hizmeti
MI - Military Intelligence
MI5 - Security Service (Military Intelligence, Section 5)
MI6 - Secret Intelligence Service (Military Intelligence, Section 6)
MPLA - People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAM - Non-Aligned Movement
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OSINT - Open-source intelligence
OSS - Office of Strategic Services
OZNA - Department for the People's Protection
PDPA - People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PDVSA - Petróleos de Venezuela S.A
PRC - The People's Republic of China
SALT II - Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II
SDB - State Security Service
SFR - Socialist Federal Republic
SIGINT - Signals Intelligence
Stasi - *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit*
U.S. - United States
U.S.A. - United States of America
UDBA - Directorate for State Security
UK - United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN - United Nations
UNITA - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) serves as the principal organ of the United Nations responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It addresses global conflicts and crises, promotes diplomatic resolutions, and fosters cooperation between nations. In 1979, during the height of the Cold War, the UNSC grappled with issues of profound geopolitical significance, including the pervasive influence of espionage and covert operations as well as the ramifications of the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan.

Espionage and covert operations were intrinsic to the Cold War dynamics, representing tools of influence and subversion employed by global superpowers such as the United States and the Soviet Union. Intelligence agencies like the CIA and KGB orchestrated clandestine activities aimed at undermining each other's interests, manipulating political landscapes, and swaying global alliances. These activities were not confined to the superpowers; smaller states and non-state actors also played roles in proxy conflicts and intelligence networks, further complicating international relations. The use of espionage raised pressing questions about state sovereignty, the ethical boundaries of intelligence work, and the broader implications for global security and stability.

Simultaneously, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 posed one of the most significant challenges to international peace. As Soviet troops entered Afghanistan to support a communist regime and suppress opposition, the conflict drew widespread condemnation and polarized the global community. This intervention became a focal point of Cold War tensions, with the United States and its allies supporting Afghan resistance fighters in what became a protracted and devastating conflict. The invasion also raised critical issues of sovereignty, international law, and the role of the United Nations in conflict resolution.

In addressing these interconnected challenges, the UNSC was tasked with navigating a complex geopolitical landscape defined by ideological divides, strategic interests, and humanitarian concerns. The interplay of espionage and direct military interventions underscored the fragile balance of power and the constant threat to international stability. Delegates to the UNSC had to contend with competing national interests, ideological commitments, and the broader implications of their decisions on global peace.

This simulation of the UNSC at SOI XXIV offers a unique opportunity to engage with these historical issues, delving into the political strategies, alliances, and conflicts that defined 1979. Delegates are encouraged to conduct thorough research, building on the historical foundation provided and preparing to represent their assigned roles with accuracy and depth. By doing so, they

will contribute to a nuanced and informed debate, developing resolutions that reflect the complexities of Cold War geopolitics and the enduring challenges of espionage, covert operations, and international conflict.

2 PERMANENT MEMBERS

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was established in 1945 as part of the post-World War II international order, with the primary responsibility of maintaining global peace and security. Its composition includes fifteen members, of which five – China, France, the Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, and the United States – hold permanent seats and possess unique privileges, most notably the power of veto. These countries, commonly referred to as the "P5", were granted permanent membership and veto authority under Article 27 of the UN Charter, recognizing their decisive roles in the Allied victory during World War II and their status as major global powers.¹

The P5 wields significant influence within the UNSC. Each of these members can unilaterally block the adoption of any substantive resolution, regardless of the majority's support. This includes resolutions related to military interventions, sanctions, peacekeeping missions, and decisions concerning international conflicts. This veto power ensures that no major action can be taken without the consent of all five permanent members, effectively placing a check on the Council's authority and reflecting the geopolitical realities of power distribution in the international system.

In 1979, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, these permanent members played pivotal roles within the UNSC. For instance, the Soviet Union, as the invading force, defended its military intervention as assistance to a friendly government threatened by internal rebellion and foreign interference. In contrast, the United States vehemently opposed the invasion, framing it as an act of aggression and a threat to the balance of power during the Cold War.²

The dynamics among these permanent members in 1979 showcased the limits of UNSC action during the Cold War, particularly when a P5 member was directly involved in the conflict, illustrating the intricacies of their unique prerogatives.

¹ORGANIZAÇÃO DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS. **Carta das Nações Unidas e Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça**. San Francisco, 1945. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter>. Accessed on: May 25th, 2025.

²MINGST, Karen A.; KARN, Alexander. **The United Nations in the 21st Century**. 5. ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2017.

2.1 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The People's Republic of China — formerly known as the Republic of China, before being renamed in 1971 — represents one of the oldest still functioning civilizations in the world, with its first ever historically documented dynasty, the Xia Dynasty, dating back to the late third millennium BCE.³ Its position of importance within the United Nations Security Council is undeniable, with the delegation being one of the five permanent members of the committee, granting it the power of veto.⁴

The Chinese delegation's use of the veto power is rather conservative, when in comparison to many other permanent members of the Council. In total, the veto power has been invoked by the Chinese government sixteen times, with its first ever use being documented in December 1955.⁵ From that point forward, this power has only been used three times until 1979.⁶

Throughout the country's rich history, it has gone through several changes regarding its government *modus operandi* and administrative forms, from dynasties to kingdoms, back to dynasties, then from dynasties to republics.⁷ Although its current governmental format is fairly recent, when observing its vast variations, covert operations and spying, in all its forms, are ever present.

The first documented case of covert operations and spying used, officially, as statecraft dates back to 1855, during the Qing dynasty. Imperial scholars of the time developed and studied the art and technique that would later be compiled into a document called *Jianchu*, an official Chinese spy manual.⁸ This document, once completed, would be sold and circulated

³GARVER, J.W. **The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia**. 1st ed. Routledge. 1977. p. 25. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315699011>. Accessed on: May 14th.

⁴UNITED NATIONS. **United Nations charter**. New York, New York city. United Nations, 26 Jun, 1945. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>. Accessed on March 21st, 2025.

⁵UNITED NATIONS. **United Nations Security Council: Security Council Report**. New York, New York city. United Nations, 26 Jun, 1945. Retrieved from: [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php#:~:text=23\)%E2%80%94the%20veto%20has%20been%20recorded%20293%20times.&text=China%20has%20used%20the%20veto%2016%20times%2C,a%20permanent%20member%20on%2025%20October%201971](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php#:~:text=23)%E2%80%94the%20veto%20has%20been%20recorded%20293%20times.&text=China%20has%20used%20the%20veto%2016%20times%2C,a%20permanent%20member%20on%2025%20October%201971). Accessed on: May 16th, 2025.

⁶*Ibidem*.

⁷YE, Lang; FEI, Zhenggong; WANG, Tianyou. **China: Five thousand years of history and civilization**. City University of HK Press, 2007. p.25.

⁸SCHOENHALS, Michael. **A Chinese Spy Manual (from the Qing Dynasty)**. Intelligence and National Security. Ed. 36 (7): 1076–80. 2021. Retrieved from: [doi:10.1080/02684527.2021.1897752](https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2021.1897752). Accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

within influential and powerful circles at the time, useful for many government officials and emperors.⁹

Later, Sun Tzu, possible military general and writer, would make one of the most influential books on statecraft in the history of modern civilization. “The Art of War” is a famous military treatise text, credited as one of the oldest records of planned guerrilla tactics and statecraft, in which the author would emphasize the importance of careful, discrete intelligence gathering for the maintenance of power by any government.¹⁰

Closer to current times, Chinese intelligence practices in the early 20th century were shaped by the tumultuous political landscape of the Qing Dynasty's fall, the Republican era, and the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the 1920s and 1930s, during the struggle between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT)¹¹, espionage became a critical tool for both factions. Notably, the former established the Central Special Branch in 1927, tasked with gathering intelligence, conducting counterintelligence, and managing covert operations.¹²

The CCP's intelligence network flourished during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), as its operatives infiltrated Japanese forces and the KMT. Leaders like Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng were instrumental in building the party's intelligence capabilities. By the time the CCP emerged victorious in 1949, it had developed a sophisticated intelligence apparatus, which became a cornerstone of the People's Republic of China.¹³

In August 1941, the CCP Central Committee released a directive emphasizing the importance of shifting the party's intelligence efforts. This new approach moved away from solely military defense and prioritized political offensives targeting both Japanese forces and the Kuomintang. Recognizing the critical role of open-source intelligence (OSINT), the Central

⁹SCHOENHALS, Michael. **A Chinese Spy Manual (from the Qing Dynasty)**. Intelligence and National Security. Ed. 36 (7): 1076–80. 2021. Retrieved from: doi:10.1080/02684527.2021.1897752. Accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

¹⁰SMITH, Kidder. **The Military Texts: The *Sunzi***. Sources of Chinese Tradition: From Earliest Times to 1600, Volume 1 (2nd ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. 1999. pp. 213–224. ISBN 978-0-231-10938-3.

¹¹Chinese liberal party, which has a more capitalist and westernized *modus operandi* administration. Would later govern Taiwan.

¹²SATRE, D. **The KGB's Black Box: Intelligence Operations and Bias in the People's Republic of China**. The Columbia Journal of Asia, [S. l.], v. 2, n. 2, 2024. DOI: 10.52214/cja.v2i2.11059. Retrieved from: <https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cja/article/view/11059>. Accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

¹³ALPYSBES, Makhsat A.; YERGALIYEVA, Danara S. **The Revolt of Three Kazakh Districts (Ili, Altai, Tarbaghatai) against Chinese Rule in Xinjiang: A Cold War Prologue (1944-1949)**. Rethinking of History: Conflict of Facts and Hypotheses: Collection of Scientific Articles. European Scientific e-Journal, v. 7, n. 13, p. 29-52, 2021. Retrieved from: https://web.archive.org/web/20211117071452id_/http://tuculart.eu/ftpgetfile.php?id=243. accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

Intelligence Department, also known as the CDSA, underscored the importance of integrating both covert and overt sources of information, ensuring that neither was overlooked.¹⁴

By 1942, a confidential publication titled *Shubao Jianxun* (translated as *Summaries of Books and Newspapers*) was being distributed among high-ranking CCP members. This publication compiled excerpts from materials originating in areas controlled by Japan and the KMT, distilling political, economic, and military intelligence for the party's leadership.¹⁵

Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China, in October 1949, the CCP initiated reforms to enhance its intelligence capabilities, particularly in OSINT. Responding to Premier Zhou Enlai's emphasis on integrating research from both open and covert sources, several key entities, including the CCP International Department, the Central Ministry of Public Security, the United Front Work Department, the Foreign Ministry, and the Government Administration Council's intelligence division, created dedicated OSINT units.¹⁶

The onset of the Korean War in October 1950 further heightened the importance of OSINT efforts. After the dissolution of the CDSA, experienced OSINT analysts from the *Summaries* team transitioned to the CCP Central Military Commission's liaison bureau. Their new focus on foreign intelligence analysis required extensive expertise in global affairs.¹⁷

When it comes to China's relations with other countries in regard to covert operations, an observable change of allies is clear. After Stalin's death, relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union (USSR) quickly soured. Mao Zedong responded harshly to Soviet policy and manifestations relating to covert operations, particularly after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, accusing the USSR under Khrushchev of abandoning its legitimacy as a socialist leader by adopting "revisionist" policies that deviated from true communist principles. This ideological rift marked the onset of the Sino-Soviet split.¹⁸

Thus, Khrushchev's approach of peaceful coexistence with capitalist nations clashed with Mao's vision of advancing global communist revolution through force if necessary.

¹⁴ALPYSBES, Makhsat A.; YERGALIYEVA, Danara S. **The Revolt of Three Kazakh Districts (Ili, Altai, Tarbaghatai) against Chinese Rule in Xinjiang: A Cold War Prologue (1944-1949)**. *Rethinking of History: Conflict of Facts and Hypotheses: Collection of Scientific Articles*. European Scientific e-Journal, v. 7, n. 13, p. 29-52, 2021. Retrieved from: https://web.archive.org/web/20211117071452id_/http://tuculart.eu/ftpgetfile.php?id=243. accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

¹⁵*Ibidem*.

¹⁶*Ibidem*.

¹⁷SATRE, D. **The KGB's Black Box: Intelligence Operations and Bias in the People's Republic of China**. *The Columbia Journal of Asia, [S. l.]*, v. 2, n. 2, 2024. DOI: 10.52214/cja.v2i2.11059. Retrieved from: <https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cja/article/view/11059>. Accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

¹⁸*Ibidem*.

Consequently, the Soviet Union shifted its view of the PRC, elevating it to a top priority for intelligence collection. However, challenges in recruiting agents, gaining access to Chinese political circles, and deciphering the country's intentions heightened tensions between the two nations, further complicating efforts to reconcile their fractured alliance and, inadvertently, pushing PRC to form closer relations with the United States of America.¹⁹

Another event that marked the souring of PRC's relations with the USSR was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The Chinese government perceived the invasion as a blatant act of Soviet expansionism and a direct threat to regional stability in Central Asia. From China's perspective, the Soviet Union's actions were part of a broader strategy to encircle the country with pro-Soviet states, particularly given Afghanistan's proximity to its western border.²⁰

The invasion also reinforced their long-standing fears of Soviet hegemonism, a core concern since the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s. Chinese leaders viewed the occupation as an aggressive move to secure dominance in the region, countering China's influence and threatening its security interests. Additionally, the invasion was seen as a violation of Afghanistan's sovereignty, an issue that resonated with China's principle of non-interference in other nations' internal affairs.²¹

Publicly, China condemned the Soviet invasion in strong terms. The Chinese government criticized the Soviet Union for undermining Afghanistan's sovereignty and destabilizing the region. Beijing also expressed solidarity with the Afghan people, calling for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops and the restoration of Afghanistan's independence. Chinese diplomats worked to build coalitions with other countries, particularly in the Non-Aligned Movement, to isolate the Soviet Union diplomatically and pressure it to withdraw from Afghanistan.²²

Beyond public condemnation, China engaged in covert operations to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Recognizing the strategic value of supporting resistance movements, the nation provided substantial aid to the Afghan mujahideen fighting against Soviet forces.

¹⁹SATRE, D. **The KGB's Black Box: Intelligence Operations and Bias in the People's Republic of China.** *The Columbia Journal of Asia, [S. l.]*, v. 2, n. 2, 2024. DOI: 10.52214/cja.v2i2.11059. Retrieved from: <https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cja/article/view/11059>. Accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

²⁰JUREŃCZYK, Łukasz. **CHINA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE STABILIZATION OF 'DEMOCRATIC' AFGHANISTAN.** *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, [S. l.]*, v. 11, n. 21, 2022. DOI: 10.22456/2238-6912.121733. Retrieved from: <https://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/austral/article/view/121733>. Accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

²¹SATRE, D. *Op. Cit.*

²²JUREŃCZYK, Łukasz. *Op. Cit.*

PRC's actions during the Soviet-Afghan conflict were not solely altruistic, they were rooted in strategic calculations. By supporting the mujahideen, the Chinese government aimed to counter Soviet influence, weakening the Soviet Union in Afghanistan served the country's broader goal of containing Soviet power and influence in the region.²³

China's covert operations and diplomatic maneuvers during this period also reinforced its commitment to countering hegemonism, a central theme of its foreign policy. The conflict further underscored the importance of intelligence gathering, strategic partnerships, and the use of indirect methods to achieve geopolitical objectives.²⁴

Not only that, the nation's involvement in the Soviet-Afghan conflict had lasting implications. It underscored its growing role as a strategic player in the Cold War, willing to take significant risks to counter perceived threats. Furthermore, the conflict highlighted their willingness to align with non-communist states, such as the United States and Saudi Arabia, to achieve its geopolitical objectives.²⁵

Espionage has been a central element of Chinese statecraft, evolving in response to internal and external challenges. By 1979, China's intelligence capabilities had become a sophisticated tool for advancing its national interests.²⁶ Meanwhile, the Soviet-Afghan conflict highlighted China's ability to leverage espionage and covert operations in pursuit of strategic objectives, underscoring the importance of intelligence in shaping the course of international relations during the Cold War era.²⁷

2.2 FRENCH REPUBLIC

A founding and permanent member of the United Nations Security Council since its creation in 1945, France maintains the power to veto decisions, having used it 9 times beginning

²³JUREŃCZYK, Łukasz. **CHINA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE STABILIZATION OF 'DEMOCRATIC' AFGHANISTAN**. AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, [S. l.], v. 11, n. 21, 2022. DOI: 10.22456/2238-6912.121733. Retrieved from:

<https://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/austral/article/view/121733>. Accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

²⁴JUREŃCZYK, Łukasz. **CHINA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE STABILIZATION OF 'DEMOCRATIC' AFGHANISTAN**. AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, [S. l.], v. 11, n. 21, 2022. DOI: 10.22456/2238-6912.121733. Retrieved from:

<https://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/austral/article/view/121733>. Accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

²⁵*Ibidem*.

²⁶SATRE, D. **The KGB's Black Box: Intelligence Operations and Bias in the People's Republic of China**.

The Columbia Journal of Asia, [S. l.], v. 2, n. 2, 2024. DOI: 10.52214/cja.v2i2.11059. Retrieved from:

<https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cja/article/view/11059>. Accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

²⁷JUREŃCZYK, Łukasz. *Op. Cit.*

in 1956 until 1979. Its position portrays one of extreme importance in the preservation of world security and diplomacy.²⁸

The solidification of La Nouvelle Vague (New Wave) movement in cinema, the rise of new technologies and consumerism,²⁹ “a period of lucidity recovered” following the extremes and excesses of the 1960s, says philosopher Pascal Bruckner.² Such was France in the 1970s.³⁰

But underneath it all, the country was struggling in its fight to maintain global influence, scared it was losing its power as a role model in ways of living to the United States.³¹

Amidst this, France saw itself as a world power of the highest rank, as the nation represented, or so it was thought, an important middle ground between the extremes of US capitalism and Soviet communism.³² This ideal had begun to fade, and the country had to find other means of exerting influence outside of its territory – something that could be achieved through espionage.

French intelligence has its roots in the Resistance against the Nazis during the occupation of France in World War Two. Free France, a resistance government claiming to be the legitimate government after the fall of the Third Republic, founded the DGSS – *Direction générale des services spéciaux* – in november of 1943, and in 1944 changed its name to DGER (*Direction générale des études et recherches*) under the direction of politician Jacques Soustelle. This organization, however, was characterized by numerous cases of nepotism, abuses and political feuds, causing Soustelle to be removed from his position.⁵

Former free-fighter André Dewavrin was then tasked to reform the agency, renaming it to SDECE (*Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage*) in December of 1945. The renewed agency brought under one head a variety of separate agencies, such as the *Deuxième Bureau*, created in the wake of the Third Republic in the early 1870s, and the BRCA (*Bureau central de renseignements et d'action*), originated in World War Two.³³

²⁸SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT. **The Security Council Veto**. Retrieved from: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/working_methods_theveto-7.pdf. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

²⁹KLIEBENSTEIN, Michael. **France in the '70s: Part 1**. Retrieved from: <https://porterpress.co.uk/blogs/news/france-in-the-1970s>. Accessed on: March 29th, 2025.

³⁰GOLSAN, Richard J. **The French Seventies: Then and Now**. Yale University Press, 2024. Retrieved from: <https://yalebooks.yale.edu/2024/10/07/the-french-seventies-then-and-now/>. Accessed on: March 29th, 2025.

³¹*Ibidem*.

³²SHEPPE, Adrian. **France in the 1970s: A Time of Decline, Doubt, and Anti-Americanism**. Retrieved from: <https://uramericansinparis.wordpress.com/2010/12/15/france-in-the-1970s-%E2%80%93-a-time-of-decline-doubt-and-anti-americanism/>. Accessed on: March 29th, 2025.

³³POIRIER, Dominique (2018). *Napoleon's Spies: Revelations of a Spy who came in from France*. Createspace, ISBN 1984922173, pp. 223–224.

In April 1982, the SDECE would be extensively reformed yet again and renamed to DGSE (*Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure*). It had been primarily independent up until the 1960s, when it was discovered to be involved in the kidnapping and presumed murder of Mehdi Ben Barka, a Moroccan revolutionary.³⁴ Following this scandal, the agency was announced to have been placed under the control of the French Ministry of Defense – in reality, it had always been under the supervision of the military since 1871, for political reasons such as anti-Bonapartism and the rise of Socialism.³⁵

The SDECE and the DGSE have been affected by numerous scandals throughout the years. In 1968, the French intelligence officer Philippe Thyraud de Vosjoli asserted in published memoirs that the SDECE had been deeply penetrated by the Soviet KGB in the 1950s. He also indicated that there had been periods of intense rivalry between the French and U.S. intelligence systems.³⁶

Outwardly, however, France was part of the Western bloc and thus a great ally to the United States, having supported it and its U.S.-backed mujahideen fighters against the Soviet Union in the Soviet-Afghan war. In January of 1980, the French Government issued a statement that deemed the Soviet invasion “unacceptable”, but still saw it as an East-South issue rather than an East-West one. France also wanted to preserve its special relationship with Moscow and was inclined towards insisting that the allies respond individually to Soviet action.¹⁰

Most of the European Community (EC) member states at the time wanted the EC, instead of NATO, to lead the Western European response to the Soviet intervention. This had come from the belief that non-Western countries might consider an EC response more palatable than a NATO or otherwise U.S.-backed one.¹¹

In conclusion, France has had quite the history with espionage, having dabbled in it in multiple ways that have been considered by the country to be in the best interest of its government. It would continue to attach itself to this resistance mentality it had since the Nazis first took over, prioritizing the autonomy and perceived freedom of its land above all. This also puts itself on display when it comes to France’s reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, backing the U.S.’s position but wanting to explore the issue not merely as an ally to the United States, but a third party with its own interests.

³⁴POIRIER, Dominique (2018). *Napoleon's Spies: Revelations of a Spy who came in from France*. Createspace, ISBN 1984922173, pp. 223–224.

³⁵*ibidem*

³⁶*ibidem*

2.3 THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

A founding and permanent member in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) — a nation comprising four distinct countries within itself — has a long history of involvement in international disputes, be it directly or not. Under the leadership of Her Royal Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, its position as a world power nation holds significant potential in regards to the resolution of world-class disputes, with many examples of it, such as the creation of the United Nations (UN) itself.³⁷ Moreover, as a permanent member of the Security Council, the UK also maintains the power to veto decisions, having used it 18 times beginning in 1956 until 1979.³⁸

During the 1970s, the U.K. faced many internal struggles, in specific the social conflict in its industrial complex, a decisive decline of the economy, a polarization of its politics with extreme movements in both the Labor and Conservative parties and a period of internal violence, specially concerning the situation in Northern Ireland.³⁹ Dubbed “the Troubles”, the Northern Irish conflict between the overwhelmingly Protestants unionists - loyalists -, who desired the province to remain part of the United Kingdom, and the fiercely Roman Catholic nationalist - republicans -, who wanted Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland.⁴⁰

In this period, amidst a scenario which could be described as a battleground of espionage, the occurrence of covert operations in Britain made the works of both the Security Service, commonly known as MI5 (Military Intelligence, Section 5) and the Secret Intelligence Service, also known as MI6 (Military Intelligence, Section 6), to be extremely necessary. Founded in 1909, though modifying its configuration during its time, the MI5 worked mostly with countering terrorism, countering state threats and protective security, focusing mostly with the internal affairs of the United Kingdom.⁴¹

³⁷MCADAMS, A. James. **East Germany and Detente: Building Authority After the Wall**. Retrieved from: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/east-germany-and-detente/5190BEA94E7BFFA2AE09F0F94F0BCC10>. Accessed on: May 17th, 2025.

³⁸UK PARLIAMENT. **The UK at the United Nations: How the UN works**. Retrieved from: <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9210/>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

³⁹BRITANNICA. **The Troubles**. Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/event/The-Troubles-Northern-Ireland-history>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

⁴⁰SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT. **The Security Council Veto**. Retrieved from: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/working_methods_theveto-7.pdf. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

⁴¹GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. **Security Service MI5: History**. Retrieved from: <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/history>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

Constituted in its current form in 1912 and reporting to the Foreign Office of the British Government, the MI6 was subsequently tasked mainly with the covert overseas collection and analysis of human intelligence on foreign nationals in support of its government and its partners. Thus, its actions involved counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, providing intelligence in support of security, and supporting stability overseas in order to disrupt terrorism and other criminal activities.⁴²

In regard to MI6 operations, it is notable to mention the Berlin Tunnel Operation, codenamed Operation REGAL — also known as Operation Gold — which was a joint effort between the MI6 and the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to intercept the Soviet Union's (USSR) transmissions, with planning starting in 1952. The idea involved the digging of a tunnel next to where the Soviet's underground communication network was located and planting wiretaps to intercepted transmissions, with the tunnel originating from the American Zone in Berlin.^{43/44}

With data collection starting in May 1955, both agencies assessed that tapping into underground communication lines in the Soviet sector of Berlin offered a good source into the Soviet and East German intelligence, respectively headed by the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* (KGB) and the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit*, commonly known as Stasi. However, unbeknownst to the CIA and MI6, the KGB had been aware of the operation since its conception via information from George Blake, a KGB mole inside MI6.⁴⁵

Even though the operation was not a secret to the KGB, it would still be considered a success, because the intelligence gathered had been genuine. This intelligence supplied both agencies specially regarding information on the activities of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, identification of those working on a Soviet atomic energy project, the Soviet's establishment of an East German army, tensions in Poland and resentment between the Soviets and East Germans.⁴⁶

Furthermore, the MI5 found itself overwhelmed with the number of Soviet intelligence agents operating undercover in London and infiltrated in several government branches, with the KGB intending on exhausting the Security Service to undermine their surveillance capabilities.

⁴²GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. **Our Mission**. Retrieved from: <https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-mission.html>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

⁴³BRITANNICA. **MI6**. Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/MI6>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

⁴⁴CIA. **The Berlin Tunnel**. Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/legacy/museum/exhibit/the-berlin-tunnel/>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

⁴⁵*Ibidem*.

⁴⁶*Ibidem*.

Yet, the Foreign Office found a solution to this situation with the discovery of KGB officer Oleg Lyalin, who was persuaded to defect by MI5 and to become a British agent, subsequently identifying a large number of fellow spies in Britain.⁴⁷

This concluded on September 24th, 1971, when the British government, led by Prime Minister Edward Heath, expelled 105 Soviet diplomats who were believed to form part of KGB espionage efforts in the United Kingdom. The codenamed Operation FOOT was a major turning point in Cold War counter-espionage operations in Britain, making the nation a hard espionage target for Soviet intelligence for the first time. Nonetheless, despite immediate negative reactions from the USSR, trade repercussions were minimal and the diplomatic relations between the nations were not broken off.⁴⁸

In 1978, Afghan President Mohammad Daud Khan was overthrown during the Saur Revolution, led by leftist military forces under Nur Mohammad Taraki. The new government, composed of the Marxist-Leninist political parties, the People's (Khalq) Party and the Banner (Parcham) Party, forged close ties with the Soviet Union whilst facing strong resistance from the Afghan population, who opposed the regime's purges and social reforms.⁴⁹

Thereafter, the overall discontent led to the emergence of insurgencies by tribal and urban groups known as the mujahideen, which intensified following the Soviet invasion in December 1979, when 30,000 Soviet troops took control of the country.⁵⁰

Moreover, the year 1979 also marked Margaret Thatcher's first year in office as Prime Minister, with a reputation for being firmly anti-Soviet. She had previously condemned the USSR's military expansionism and its involvement in Third World conflicts such as Angola, being subsequently dubbed "The Iron Lady" by Soviet military newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* for her political style and anti-Communist views.^{51/52}

In light of the UK's critical economic situation and its military capabilities' limitations, any overt military action to counter the USSR was not considered possible. Despite that, by

⁴⁷ASPECTS OF HISTORY. **Espionage In The UK**. Retrieved from: <https://aspectsofhistory.com/espionage-in-the-uk/>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

⁴⁸GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. **Security Service MI5: The later Cold War**. Retrieved from: <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/history/the-cold-war/the-later-cold-war>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

⁴⁹BRITANNICA. **Afghan War**. Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghan-War>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

⁵⁰*Ibidem*.

⁵¹KING'S COLLEGE LONDON. **The Second 'Great Game': Britain and the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, 1979 - 1980**. Retrieved from: <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/the-second-great-game-britain-and-the-soviet-intervention-in-afghanistan-1979-1980>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

⁵²WASHINGTON POST. **'Irony Lady': How a Moscow propagandist gave Margaret Thatcher her famous nickname**. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/04/08/irony-lady-how-a-moscow-propagandist-gave-margaret-thatcher-her-famous-nickname/>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

mid-January 1980, Prime Minister Thatcher, the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and the Cabinet Secretary Sir Robert Armstrong made the decision to support anti-Soviet and anti-Communist resistance in the form of both indirect and direct support, with secret arming, funding and supplying the factions. Thus, the UK played more of a direct combat role – particularly the Special Air Service — supporting resistance groups in practical manners.⁵³

Considering its difficult position, covert operations became the default British response, especially in the support made for the Mujahideen group Jamiat-e Islami, commended by Ahmad Shah Massoud, which had received little support from the United States and Pakistan. Lastly, due to its social and economic scenarios during this time, the United Kingdom didn't deal directly with military operations, supporting the Western nations by means of funding and intelligence gathering, using its well-established organizations to contribute to the resistance.⁵⁴

2.4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America (U.S.A.) is a North American country and a permanent member of the Security Council, holding the powerful right to veto any resolution, granting it considerable sway over critical international security decisions. This authority has been exercised mildly; for instance, historical data shows the U.S. cast 21 vetoes between 1946 and 1979.⁵⁵

The year 1979 was deeply shaped by the ongoing Cold War, a protracted period of ideological and geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. This rivalry manifested in a relentless “race for superior military power” and an “era of espionage”, where both global powers actively sought to undermine each other through intelligence gathering and covert operations.⁵⁶ The United States relied heavily on its intelligence community, which comprised eighteen organizations, including entities within the Department

⁵³WASHINGTON POST. ‘**Irony Lady**’: How a Moscow propagandist gave Margaret Thatcher her famous nickname. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/04/08/irony-lady-how-a-moscow-propagandist-gave-margaret-thatcher-her-famous-nickname/>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

⁵⁴*Ibidem*.

⁵⁵UNITED NATIONS. **Security Council Data - Vetoes Since 1946**. [S. l.]: United Nations, 2025. Dataset. Available at: <https://psdata.un.org/dataset/DPPA-SCVETOES>. Accessed on: 24 May 2025.

⁵⁶COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. **Tools of Foreign Policy - What Is Intelligence?**. [S. l.]: Council on Foreign Relations, [s.d.]. Available at: <https://education.cfr.org/learn/learning-journey/tools-foreign-policy/what-is-intelligence>. Accessed on: 23 May 2025.

of Defense and Department of State, alongside independent agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).⁵⁷

A crucial component of this global intelligence posture was the Five Eyes alliance, a multilateral agreement for joint signals intelligence cooperation among the U.S., the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This alliance had previously developed sophisticated surveillance systems, such as ECHELON, specifically to monitor communications from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, underscoring a long-standing, formalized approach to intelligence sharing and collection against perceived adversaries.⁵⁸

The U.S. government maintained specific official definitions and principles concerning covert action and intelligence gathering abroad. “Covert action” was defined as activities intended to influence foreign political, economic, or military conditions while concealing the U.S. role, to be pursued only at the direction of the President.⁵⁹ The CIA served as the primary agency for implementing such actions. Crucially, official definitions of covert action, as outlined in directives such as NSC 10/2⁶⁰, explicitly excluded “espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations” from their scope.⁶¹

This internal categorization suggested a nuanced approach to clandestine activities, distinguishing between direct influence operations and traditional intelligence collection. Furthermore, a significant ethical boundary had been established in 1976, when the U.S. intelligence community was banned from using assassination as a foreign policy tool.⁶²

The explicit exclusion of “espionage” from the official definition of “covert action”, alongside the ban on assassination, revealed a deliberate attempt by the American government to compartmentalize and legitimize certain clandestine activities while disavowing others, even if the lines blurred in practice or perception by foreign adversaries. This nuanced internal

⁵⁷THE NATIONAL WWII MUSEUM. **Cold Conflict | The National WWII Museum | New Orleans**. New Orleans: The National WWII Museum, [s.d.]. Available at: <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/cold-conflict>. Accessed on: 23 May 2025.

⁵⁸PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL. **Five Eyes**. [S. l.]: Privacy International, [s.d.]. Available at: <https://privacyinternational.org/learn/five-eyes>. Accessed on: 24 May 2025.

⁵⁹COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, *op. cit.*

⁶⁰NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. **National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects**. Washington, D.C., 18 June 1948. In: UNITED STATES. Department of State. Office of the Historian. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d292>. Accessed on: 24 May 2025.

⁶¹UNITED STATES. Department of State. Office of the Historian. **Note on U.S. Covert Actions**. In: UNITED STATES. Department of State. Office of the Historian. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, [s.d.]. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/notes>. Accessed on: 23 May 2025.

⁶²COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, *op. cit.*

definition formed part of the diplomatic posture, enabling the U.S. to articulate its position on various clandestine activities differently depending on context and perceived legitimacy.

The American diplomatic position on international espionage was also firmly grounded in its adherence to international law, particularly the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This international legal document outlines core principles such as the inviolability of mission premises, the special duty of the receiving state to protect them, the right to free communication for official purposes, and diplomatic immunity for agents from criminal jurisdiction.⁶³ The U.S. consistently invoked international legal principles, particularly the Vienna Convention, to defend its diplomatic missions and personnel, even as its own intelligence activities were subject to foreign accusations of violating host country laws.

When the U.S. embassy in Tehran was seized, the country immediately and strongly denounced it as an “egregious violation” of the Vienna Convention.⁶⁴ By consistently appealing to these established norms, the American government sought to delegitimize the actions of its adversaries and reinforce the legal protections for its own diplomatic presence globally. This demonstrates a pragmatic diplomatic stance: upholding the framework of international law is crucial for the U.S. to operate globally, even if its intelligence activities sometimes test the boundaries of that framework, as seen in the Iranian “spy den” counter-narrative.

Regarding the American position on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of 1979, the second half of the 1970’s decade was marked by the initial foreign policy framework of Jimmy Carter which, by using a “principled approach to foreign affairs”⁶⁵, aimed to restore the “moral bearings of American foreign policy”, introducing a distinct emphasis on human rights.⁶⁶ In 1977, during a speech in South Carolina, Carter defended the idea of pragmatism in international relations, defending a better, more mutually beneficial, Soviet-American relationship.⁶⁷

This idealistic foundation, with a humanitarian and cosmopolitan approach, was an object of internal scrutiny as a growing concern of Soviet military expansion rose. Members of the Carter administration, such as key foreign policy advisors, externalized concerns about

⁶³UNITED NATIONS. **Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocols**. [S. l.]: Organization of American States, 1961. Available at:

<https://www.oas.org/legal/english/docs/viennaconvdiplomrelat.htm>. Accessed on: 24 May 2025.

⁶⁴ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA. **Iran hostage crisis**. [S. l.]: Britannica, 2025. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-hostage-crisis>. Accessed on: 24 May 2025.

⁶⁵UNITED STATES. Department of State. Office of the Historian. **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I**. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014. Available at: <https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf>. Accessed on: 23 May 2025.

⁶⁶*Ibidem.*, p. 231.

⁶⁷*Ibidem.*

“frustration over recent developments in Africa and Afghanistan”⁶⁸ and the public perception of a weakened American military.⁶⁹

One of the main assets of American foreign policy in the Middle-East during the Carter administration was its strategic partnership with the Iranian government during the two previous decades, adopting a policy of non-intervention as stated unequivocally by President Carter – “We have not and we will not intervene in Iran”. Still, Iran was a major country for U.S. and its allies, as stated by Carter in sequence of the previous quote:

“yet the future of Iran continues to be of deep concern to us and to our friends and allies. It’s an important nation in a critical part of the world, an immediate neighbor of the Soviet Union, a major oil producer that also sits beside the principal artery for most of the world’s trade in oil. And it is still a significant potential force for stability and progress in the region.”

With this in mind, some within the Carter administration viewed the government’s stance as potentially emboldening Soviet actions in Afghanistan. As is the case, especially, due to the policy of non-intervention, aligned with other official positions on American foreign policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis of November 1979⁷⁰.

Due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which resulted in the substitution of President Hafizullah Amin for the Soviet-aligned “new puppet leader”⁷¹ Babrak Karmal,⁷² President Carter's personal perception of the Soviet Union underwent a profound and immediate shift, changing “most [more] drastically in the last week than even the previous two and one-half years before that”.⁷³ This personal transformation at the highest level directly informed the subsequent punitive and comprehensive U.S. response, signaling the effective end of the détente era as it had been previously understood. The invasion was perceived as a fundamental betrayal of the cooperative spirit of détente, compelling a re-evaluation of the underlying assumptions of U.S.-Soviet relations.

In this scenario, to the U.S. government, Afghan occupation directly threatened “both Iran and Pakistan”⁷⁴ and represented a need for change in American foreign policy. In this

⁶⁸*Ibidem.*, p. 394

⁶⁹*Ibidem.*

⁷⁰UNITED STATES. Department of State. Office of the Historian. **The Iranian Hostage Crisis**. [S. l.]: Office of the Historian, 2019. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/departmentshistory/short-history/iraniancrises>. Accessed on: 23 May 2025.

⁷¹UNITED STATES, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 685

⁷²SOVIET UNION. Politburo. **Politbiuro Report on Afghanistan**. [S. l.]: MATRIX, 1979. Available at: <https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1980-2/invasion-of-afghanistan/invasion-of-afghanistan-texts/politbiuro-report-on-afghanistan>. Accessed on: 23 May 2025.

⁷³UNITED STATES, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 678.

⁷⁴UNITED STATES, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 685.

manner, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan directly led to the articulation of the “Carter Doctrine” in the 1980 State of the Union address.⁷⁵ President Carter declared:

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.⁷⁶

This declaration marked a dramatic expansion of U.S. security commitments beyond traditional Cold War fronts in Europe and East Asia, establishing a new pillar of U.S. global strategy. The administration consciously drew parallels to the Truman Doctrine, which had defined U.S. containment policy in post-World War II Europe, suggesting a deliberate effort to establish a new, foundational foreign policy principle in response to perceived Soviet expansionism into a critical new geopolitical zone.

The U.S. government's response to the Soviet invasion was designed to be punitive and also to be a warning, based on the belief that the Soviet Union had “discounted our likely reaction”⁷⁷ and that previous expressions of concern had not been heeded, leading to this “extraordinary application of Soviet military power”.⁷⁸

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the United States government adopted a comprehensive set of punitive measures to deter further Soviet aggression and demonstrate its strong disapproval. These included temporarily recalling the U.S. Ambassador from Moscow and the refusal to sign the SALT II treaty⁷⁹, a crucial arms control agreement.

Economically, trade with the Soviet Union was severely restricted, with no high technology or strategic items licensed for sale.⁸⁰ A major punitive economic measure was the non-delivery of 17 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviet Union, beyond committed amounts, which aimed to impact the Soviet livestock industry. Additionally, the U.S. delayed

⁷⁵CARTER, Jimmy. **The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress**. [S. l.]: The American Presidency Project, 1980. Available at: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-state-the-union-address-delivered-before-joint-session-the-congress>. Accessed on: 23 May 2025.

⁷⁶CARTER, Jimmy. **The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress**. [S. l.]: The American Presidency Project, 1980. Available at: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-state-the-union-address-delivered-before-joint-session-the-congress>. Accessed on: 23 May 2025.

⁷⁷UNITED STATES, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 682.

⁷⁸*Ibidem*.

⁷⁹UNITED STATES. Department of State. **Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II)**. [S. l.]: U.S. Department of State, 1979. Available at: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5195.htm>. Accessed on: 23 May 2025.

⁸⁰CARTER, Jimmy. **Address to the Nation on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan**. [S. l.]: The American Presidency Project, 1980. Available at: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-the-soviet-invasion-afghanistan>. Accessed on: 23 May 2025.

the opening of new American or Soviet consular facilities and deferred most cultural and economic exchanges under consideration.⁸¹ In terms of international diplomacy, the U.S. immediately sought to rally global condemnation of the Soviet action.

2.5 UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), most commonly known simply as the Soviet Union, is a transcontinental Eurasian estate comprising of 15 socialist republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgiziya, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.⁸² It emerged from the 1917 Russian Revolution, when the Bolsheviks, radical leftist revolutionaries, overthrew the centuries-old Romanov monarchy. Thus, there came to be the largest country in the world, extending to almost one-sixth of Earth's land surface and housing over 260 million nationals.^{83/84}

The world's first Marxist-Communist state was an original member of the United Nations from its creation, in 1945,⁸⁵ and a permanent member of the Security Council from its following year. As a permanent member, the USSR held the power to veto the Council's resolutions if it so pleased, and has used it extensively, amounting to 113 times as of 1979.⁸⁶

A period of cautious optimism preceded the 1970s in the Soviet Union, during which its foreign policy shifted toward peaceful cooperation with the West, while simultaneously reinforcing its governance over its vast and powerful territorial expanse.⁸⁷ Moreover, the Soviet government's highest decision-making body, the Politburo, adopted a strategy that reflected its traditional diplomatic posture within the Security Council. This approach signaled a

⁸¹UNITED STATES. Department of State. Office of the Historian. **United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War**. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, [s.d.]. Available at: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm>. Accessed on: 23 May 2025.

⁸²BRITANNICA. **Soviet Union**. Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Soviet-Union>. Accessed on: May 30th, 2025.

⁸³HISTORY CHANNEL. **USSR established | December 1922**. Retrieved from: <https://www.history.com/articles/history-of-the-soviet-union>. Accessed on: May 30th, 2025.

⁸⁴SEVENTEEN MOMENTS IN SOVIET HISTORY. **On Preliminary Results of the 1979 Census**. Retrieved from: <https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1980-2/sixth-all-union-census/sixth-all-union-census-texts/on-preliminary-results-of-the-1979-census/>. Accessed on: May 30th, 2025.

⁸⁵UNITED NATIONS. **Russian Federation**. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states/russian-federation>. Accessed on: May 30th, 2025.

⁸⁶THE SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT. **The Security Council Veto**. Retrieved from: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/working_methods_theveto-7.pdf. Accessed on: May 30th, 2025.

⁸⁷BBC. **Back in the USSR: the Soviet sixties**. Retrieved from: <https://open.spotify.com/episode/6blwqoG19XJzx1PjEYk1hv?si=7a4f53bc1fd54aa9>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

commitment to “a preliminary exchange of views on establishing an international organization and maintaining peace and security”.⁸⁸

Nations worldwide, in a collective exercise of power, expanded peripheral administrative activities, blurring the traditional boundaries between war and peace — a hallmark of the Cold War. Consequently, subversion became institutionalized as a legitimate instrument of statecraft, with espionage and covert operations serving as deeply entrenched and potent tools of political influence.⁸⁹

Additionally, Soviet anti-war approach objectives relied on upholding innate compelling superior forces leverage, especially nuclear power, to raise fear and corrupt enemy security arrangements. This made the integration of military and intelligence efforts essential in formulating key measures for exerting influence and achieving control.⁹⁰

On the following, the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* (KGB) or Committee for State Security — a centralized, government-linked unit⁹¹ — oversaw foreign espionage, counter-intelligence, domestic security, political repression, and ideological influence. These functions served as instruments to counter growing demands for liberalization and to suppress disaffected nationalist movements across Eastern Europe.⁹²

Along with border protection and safeguarding the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the KGB functioned as a central pillar of the Soviet Union’s “covert imaginary”.^{93/94} The organization ensured compliance from an inside out

⁸⁸CHURILIN, ALEX. **Russia and the Creation of the United Nations**. Retrieved from: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/ONU_alexander_churilin.pdf. Accessed on: May 18th, 2025.

⁸⁹CHURILIN, ALEX. **Russia and the Creation of the United Nations**. Retrieved from: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/ONU_alexander_churilin.pdf. Accessed on: May 18th, 2025.

⁹⁰LOWENSTEIN, Julie. **US Foreign Policy and the Soviet-Afghan War: A Revisionist History**. Retrieved from: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/applebaum_award/9/?utm_source=elischolar.library.yale.edu%2Fapplebaum_award%2F9&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages. Accessed on: May 21st, 2025.

⁹¹BRITANNICA. **KGB - Soviet Security, Intelligence, Espionage**. Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/KGB/Creation-and-role-of-the-KGB>. Accessed on: May 19th, 2025.

⁹²FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS. **Covert Action Against the Soviet Union 1969**. Retrieved from: <https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/frus1969.pdf>. Accessed on: May 18th, 2025.

⁹³The “covert imaginary” was a commonplace of spread assumptions about affective structures, images and attitudes about political secrecy.”

⁹⁴HERMAN, Michael; MASTNY, Vojtech. **Did Intelligence matter in the Cold War?**. Retrieved from: <https://fhs.brage.unit.no/fhs-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/99493/FS0106.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=yhttps://academic.oup.com/ips/article/18/3/olae024/7708152>. Accessed on: May 19th, 2025.

perspective through the surveillance of citizens and further types of “active measures”, operations designed to warrant the USSR’s policy goals to allying countries around the world.⁹⁵

These activities were, however, seemingly shaped by the Reagan administration to be interpreted as both a target and vehicle. It perpetuated an anti-war movement as a subsisting disguise for a repressive nature of the Soviet system and its imperialistic intentions.⁹⁶

This discourse imposed a warning of a national threat to the United States, which encouraged long-range Soviet distribution of socio-political issues, dissident literature and operations aimed at globally sided nations’ elites.⁹⁷

Thus, increasing US-USSR local competition for intellectual dominance that would later implode in a time of “wars of national liberation”, as well as dictatorships inflicted by both intelligence actors and ordinary individuals as “alluring subjects” who can “touch the magic”⁹⁸ of covert political operations.⁹⁹

An emerging dual approach of clandestine activities complicated Western policy responses, forcing involved states into facing insisting diplomatic threats and civil wars. Next, a profoundly rooted distrust within state departments' relations, showing disparaging hopes of rapprochement and challenging long-lasting existence of security achieved through repressive and deceptive means.¹⁰⁰

Furthermore, an undue peace defense proposed by the USSR was overthrown by an idealistic construction of “politics of truth”. A theory in which the anti-war protestor appeared as a dangerous, disinformed subject.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵RIHELIE, Kevin. **The “KGB Wanted List” and the Evolving Soviet Pursuit of Defectors**. Retrieved from: <https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article/26/3/37/125441/The-KGB-Wanted-List-and-the-Evolving-Soviet>. Accessed on: May 20th, 2025.

⁹⁶WRYTHE, JEFFREY. **Soviet Active Measures and the Second Cold War: Security, Truth, and the Politics of Self** Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olae024>. Accessed on: May 19th, 2025.

⁹⁷NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. **Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, USSR. Secret; Eyes Only**. Retrieved from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v12/d103>. Accessed on: May 19th, 2025.

⁹⁸VEEREN VAN, E. **Secrecy's subjects: Special operators in the US shadow war**. *European Journal of International Security*, 4(3), 386- 414. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2019.20>. Accessed on: May 19th, 2025.

⁹⁹*Ibidem*.

¹⁰⁰RUMER, EUGENE; SOKOLSKY, RICHARD. **Etched in Stone: Russian Strategic Culture and the Future of Transatlantic Security**. Retrieved from: <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/09/etched-in-stone-russian-strategic-culture-and-the-future-of-transatlantic-security?lang=en>. Accessed on: May 19th, 2025.

¹⁰¹*Ibidem*.

That culminated in hostile attempts to undermine Soviet institutions and international influence. Unfortunately, it went unnoticed by intelligence channels despite their important role in crisis de-escalation during potential armed war calamities.¹⁰²

Ultimately, covert operations' unrealistic ascending plans were impaired with bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption that lead to a lacking portrait of declining international and domestic situations, jeopardizing any countries and specially the USSR's regime credibility by the end of the 1980s.¹⁰³

Eventually, as an active member of the Security Council, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics sustained unaffected posture before espionage accusations, balancing eroded ambiguity.¹⁰⁴ Finally, the eastern european territory worked under a standpoint that defined "peace" not an end in itself, but a facilitating phase to strategic political strength. For that, presidents leveraged administration mobilization capability with other participating nations, while careful to move uncompromisingly.¹⁰⁵

In that regard, dissident movements vitality operated through resistance to the Brezhnev doctrine.¹⁰⁶ The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the following state of suppressing interventions of communist countries on each other's affairs if the cause was ever threatened.¹⁰⁷

Previous anti-government uprisings in East Germany and Hungary, after the Republics still resonated, causing the retrieval of reforms and prison of many independence advocates. This scenario led to what would come to be the Soviet-Afghan war.¹⁰⁸

On December 8, 1979, a private meeting was held and attended by the CC CPSU Politburo members in the means of discussing the consequences and contrasting justification

¹⁰²*Ibidem.*

¹⁰³PONS, Silvio; ROMERO, Federico. **Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodization.** Retrieved from: <https://ia601604.us.archive.org/17/items/221463/Silvio%20Pons%20-%20Reinterpreting%20the%20End%20of%20he%20Cold%20War.pdf>. Accessed on: May 19th, 2025.

¹⁰⁴OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN. **Paper Prepared by the United Nations Planning Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs.** Retrieved from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v03/d28#:~:text=In%20view%20of%20Soviet%20non,without%20necessarily%20increasing%20world%20security>. Accessed on: May 19th, 2025.

¹⁰⁵OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN. **Soviet Conceptions of 'Security'.** Retrieved from: <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA096463.pdf>. Accessed on: May 19th, 2025.

¹⁰⁶CES. **The Fall of The Soviet Union.** Retrieved from: <https://europe.unc.edu/iron-curtain/history/the-fall-of-the-soviet-union/>. Accessed on: May 21st, 2025.

¹⁰⁷GALEOTTI, Mark. **Active Measures: Russia's Covert Geopolitical Operations.** Retrieved from: <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/active-measures-russias-covert-geopolitical-operations-0>. Accessed on: May 21st, 2025.

¹⁰⁸OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN. **Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II.** Retrieved from: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt>. Accessed on: May 21st, 2025.

sending soviet troops to Afghanistan would pose.¹⁰⁹ As a result, a second impending threat presented itself as a sudden loss of economic and political Soviet capital in the region, exposing a stagnant superpower status.¹¹⁰

In contribution, the sole decision on whether to intervene militarily or not brought out an intellectual crisis in the Defense Ministry. It was manifested that such a reckless intervention would cause more harm to Afghan people who were keen about foreign intervention.¹¹¹

Another contributing factor to uncertain procedures was secrecy. That entailed in all orders being given orally and a breakage of a "unified thinking" hierarchical system which would unravel in in-line steps and total control.¹¹²

Nonetheless, the Senate's ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT-II) happened right before the December 24, 1979 invasion. Conveniently, presenting an alibi to US president Jimmy Carter's decision of withdrawing from negotiations.¹¹³

However, at the chance of being turned against by Muslims living in national territory, Soviet troops still responded to the uprising commanded by Hafizullah Amin, a communist, but anti-Soviet leader.¹¹⁴ Along with solidifying military positions, the USSR also invested in reaching gas and trade routes, which only brought further internal power problems to the country.¹¹⁵

At a long length, over a hundred thousand troops occupied urban areas, large towns and hiding in the mountains, which caused American reinforcements to emerge in a timely manner. The US supplied anti-aircraft missiles to prevent rural areas bombardment and mujahideen groups.¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁹DIGITAL ARCHIVE. **Alexander Lyakhovskiy's Account of the Decision of the CC CPSU Decision to Send Troops to Afghanistan.** Retrieved from: <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/alexander-lyakhovskiys-account-decision-cc-cpsu-decision-send-troops-afghanistan>. Accessed on: May 29th 10497012286800010004703049759537411030000135968, 2025.

¹¹⁰*Ibidem.*

¹¹¹DIGITAL ARCHIVE. **Alexander Lyakhovskiy's Account of the Decision of the CC CPSU Decision to Send Troops to Afghanistan.** Retrieved from: <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/alexander-lyakhovskiys-account-decision-cc-cpsu-decision-send-troops-afghanistan>. Accessed on: May 29th 10497012286800010004703049759537411030000135968, 2025.

¹¹²*Ibidem.*

¹¹³US DEPARTMENT OF STATE. **The Second Round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1979.** Retrieved from: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/103736.htm>. Accessed on: May 21st, 2025.

¹¹⁴BBC. **The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.** Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/articles/zst6vj6#zq9ykhv>. Accessed on: May 21st, 2025.

¹¹⁵*Ibidem.*

¹¹⁶BRITANNICA. **Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.** Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Soviet-invasion-of-Afghanistan>. Accessed on: May 21st, 2025.

In due course, Afghanistan was rapidly compared to a type of Soviet Union's Vietnam: a high cost, contradictory war with little to no chance of succeeding against local guerrilla forces.¹¹⁷ As a result, countries revoked ministerial contact, asked for reallocation or widespread boycott of the 1980 Olympic games.¹¹⁸

For instance, Australia and Canada took action on grain sales while the United Kingdom steered Soviet condemnation nations before the United Nations. Its purpose was to sample outcomes of strong western reactions and prevent Soviets from choosing armed options in the future, which would mean greater defeat.¹¹⁹

Although, in hindsight, it is said that the United States looked for a more developed competitive approach to armed governance and dominance asserting techniques, the politburo's limited counterforce came to a halt with a faltering economy and discredited infrastructure because of the millions of deceased and refugees Afghan civilians.¹²⁰

Decisively, after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1988 and signed the Geneva Peace Accords, troops started to withdraw from Afghan territory. As of 1989, plenty of indirect evidence from international terrorism support from the Soviet Union scattered, endorsing a crisis state which restored fearsome revolutionary movements, a predicting sign of regime downfall.¹²¹ The clan structure of the Afghans, terrain, and lifeline from Pakistan alliance prevented the Soviets from becoming successful.¹²²

¹¹⁷*Ibidem.*

¹¹⁸*Ibidem.*

¹¹⁹HUGHES, Geraint. **The Second 'Great Game': Britain and the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, 1979 - 1980.** Retrieved from: <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/the-second-great-game-britain-and-the-soviet-intervention-in-afghanistan-1979-1980>. Accessed on: May 19th, 2025.

¹²⁰TEXAS NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW. **Negotiating Primacy: Strategic Stability, Superpower Arms Control, and the End of the Cold War.** Retrieved from: <https://tnsr.org/2025/03/negotiating-primacy-strategic-stability-superpower-arms-control-and-the-end-of-the-cold-war/>. Accessed on: May 21st, 2025.

¹²¹FAS. **Active Measures.** Retrieved from: <https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/kgb/su0523.htm>. Accessed on: May 21st, 2025.

¹²²ROY, KAUSHIK. **The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: 1979-88.** Retrieved from: <https://academic.oup.com/book/4199/chapter-abstract/146021450?redirectedFrom=fulltext>. Accessed on: May 29th, 2025.

3 NON PERMANENT VOTING MEMBERS

In addition to its five permanent members, the United Nations Security Council is composed of ten non-permanent members, elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. These seats are allocated based on regional representation, ensuring geographic diversity: five from African and Asian states, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, two from Western Europe and other states, and one from Eastern Europe. In the case of this meeting, the non-permanent members included countries such as Chile, East Germany, Egypt, India, Iran, Venezuela, Vietnam and West Germany.¹²³

Non-permanent members possess the same voting rights as the P5 when it comes to passing resolutions. However, unlike the permanent members, they do not have veto power, which significantly limits their ability to block or alter the Council's outcomes when a P5 member disagrees. Despite this limitation, non-permanent members play a crucial role in shaping debates, drafting resolutions, and representing the perspectives of the broader international community. Their participation brings attention to regional concerns and contributes to the legitimacy and balance of the Council's decisions.¹²⁴

3.1 REPUBLIC OF CHILE

The Republic of Chile was, by 1979, a military dictatorship led by General Augusto Pinochet, who had seized power in a coup d'état in 1973. The country was marked by political repression, censorship, and widespread human rights violations. Economically, Chile was undergoing significant neoliberal reforms, these included privatization, deregulation, and free-market policies, which aimed to stabilize the economy and control inflation but also led to increased inequality and social unrest. Internationally, Chile faced criticism for its authoritarian rule, yet maintained strong economic ties with Western countries.

After the 1953 Cuban Revolution, the Global South experienced decades of a rebelling political scenario which led to the September 11, 1973, Augusto Pinochet's coup d'etat in Chile. A military junta composed of heads of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force deposed the country's first self-declared communist president Salvador Allende.¹²⁵

¹²³ORGANIZAÇÃO DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS. **Carta das Nações Unidas e Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça**. San Francisco, 1945. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter>. Accessed on: May 25th, 2025.

¹²⁴ORGANIZAÇÃO DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS. **Carta das Nações Unidas e Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça**. San Francisco, 1945. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter>. Accessed on: May 25th, 2025.

¹²⁵OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN. **Chile**. Retrieved from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/ch4>. Accessed on: May 23rd, 2025.

These actions represented the end of an era of populism, a governance position based on a commonplace of social necessities and ideas.¹²⁶ It posed as a direct result of JFK's Alliance of Progress and a Latin American outgrowth for Operation Gladio, a group of covert operations organized by the Western Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) aiming to avert the rise of the Communist ideology.¹²⁷

Eventually, it was later revealed, United States President Richard Nixon met with a rightwing Chilean media mogul to discuss blocking the socialist leader's path to the presidency.¹²⁸ This decision was motivated by a belief of profound anti-US bias and attempt of economic independence, which tampered with a well-established American interventionism through first base metal industries and exportation in the territory.¹²⁹

Two years later, in November, 1975, Pinochet's torturous regime was solidified by the creation of a system for the pursuit of political opponents. Those were defined as citizens who portrayed contrary opinions to the government all over Latin America, later known as Operation Condor.¹³⁰

As it followed, the American government showed increasing concern over international diplomatic repercussions of victims' assassinations.¹³¹ Non-compromised media showed emerging suspicions for a direct link from the National Security Council actions such as sabotage, political action and propaganda to Chile's deterioration of the internal prestige.¹³²

As interest in local politics lessened, the idea of a self-sufficient security and survival military power sustained an ambiguous acceptance of covert operations.¹³³ Accordingly,

¹²⁶CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. **The World Factbook: Chile**. Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ci.html>. Accessed on: May 23rd, 2025.

¹²⁷NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. **National Security Council Directive, NSC 5412/2, Covert Operations**. Retrieved from: <https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/national-security-council-directive-nsc-5412-2-covert-operations/>. Accessed on: May 23rd, 2025.

¹²⁸THE GUARDIAN. **Files reveal Nixon role in plot to block Allende from Chilean presidency**. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/08/richard-nixon-plot-allende-chile-presidency>. Accessed on: May 23rd, 2025.

¹²⁹NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE. **The Coup in Chile: What Did Nixon Know and When Did He Know it?**. Retrieved from: <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2022-09-12/coup-chile-what-did-nixon-know-and-when-did-he-know-it>. Accessed on: May 23rd, 2025.

¹³⁰CELS. **Operation Condor. A criminal conspiracy to forcibly disappear people**. Retrieved from: <https://www.cels.org.ar/especiales/plancondor/en/#una-asociacion-ilicita-para-reprimir-opositores>. Accessed on: May 23rd, 2025.

¹³¹BALARDINI, Lorena; LESSA, Francesca. **No Safe Haven: Operation Condor and Transnational Repression in South America**. *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 68, Issue 2, June 2024. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae113>. Accessed on: May 23rd, 2025.

¹³²ROSS, César. **Chile and Japan During the Pinochet Regime, 1974-1989**. Retrieved from: <https://www.revistas.unijui.edu.br/index.php/direitoshumanosedemocracia/article/view/4025/3434>. Accessed on: May 23rd, 2025.

¹³³HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER. **How did the American Administrations (Nixon, Ford, Carter) react to the human rights violations of Pinochet's dictatorship? An account of the United States' relation with Chile**

national intelligence agency DINA (*Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional*) acted to conceal third-party involvement and sign a decreasing human rights violations in exchange for economic aid, electronic surveillance and indirect military aid through an arbiter country (tanks, ships, submarines).¹³⁴

Chile's international stance on espionage and covert operations was closely linked to its internal security policies and anti-communist agenda under the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet. The regime actively collaborated with other South American dictatorships through Operation Condor, a U.S.-backed intelligence network aimed at suppressing leftist movements across the continent. Chilean intelligence services, notably DINA, engaged in covert operations beyond national borders, including surveillance, abductions, and assassinations of political opponents in exile. Although not officially acknowledged, these activities reflected a tacit endorsement of international espionage as a tool for regime security and ideological control during the Cold War.¹³⁵

Furthermore, despite a silent stand on internally compromising security matters, Chile's UNSC representatives, together with neighboring countries of relevant political alliance and equivalent secluded views (Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay) voted on all 12 resolutions adopted on the Afghan war between the period of 1980-1986.¹³⁶

In consonance, General Alfredo Canales expressed deep concern on a comparative note and indicative diplomatic alignments as stated in a January 1980 meeting (S/Agenda/2190):

[...] Together with many other states of the organization, the Government of Chile signed the letter requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in Afghanistan as a result of the Soviet military aggression in that country. [...] My country, which has experienced intervention by that super-power and by Castroism, has the undeniable moral authority to denounce this hypocritical attitude. During that sombre period in our history, the people of Chile, although the majority

(1973-1981) through its declassified files. Retrieved from: <https://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/en/topics/how-did-the-american-administrations-nixon-ford-carter-react-to-the-human-rights-violations-of-pinochets-dictatorship-an-account-of-the-united-states-relation-with-chile-1973-1981-through-its>. Accessed on: May 23rd, 2025.

¹³⁴KISSINGER, Henry A. Memorandum, “**Memorandum for the President,**” November 5, 1970. In *The Chile Reader: History, Culture, Politics*. Edited by Elizabeth Quay Hutchinson, Thomas Miller Klublock, and Nara B. Milanich, 381-383. Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2013. Accessed May 23rd, 2025.

¹³⁵KORNBLUH, Peter. **The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability**. New York: The New Press, 2003.

¹³⁶VALDAI. **The Withdrawal of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan: 35 years on UN General Assembly Resolutions.** Retrieved from: <https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-withdrawal-of-soviet-troops-from-afghanistan/>. Accessed on: May 30th, 2025.

strongly supported freedom, were forced to undergo pressure and all kinds of intervention and interference directed by Moscow.¹³⁷

Nonetheless, he continued to address the dangerous repercussions of small country invasions:

The situation we are witnessing today, which threatens a non-aligned country, should cause us to ponder the dangers which exist for small countries such as those that wish to maintain an independent position within the system of balance of power. [...] We believe that the Kremlin, as has been proved in the Security Council, in keeping with its political and ideological objectives, is aimed at whose strategic importance has now been heightened by the state of the world economy. For this reason, the Government of Moscow has no hesitation in using totalitarian methods we thought belonged to a distant past.¹³⁸

To conclude, a plea to the defense of law and UN Charter principles was made:

In the light of the foregoing, it is my government's conviction that the United Nations - and primarily the Security Council - must convey to the international community unanimous condemnation of the Soviet Union's immoral actions in Afghanistan. For that reason, we have called vigorously for the immediate withdrawal of forces, for the cessation of Soviet interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and for the respect by the Soviet Union and other States for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Afghanistan.¹³⁹

Ultimately, as an avid Western bloc defender, Chile's stance on the Cold War reaffirming national conflicts remained conditioned to its administrative maintenance necessities.¹⁴⁰ As most countries under the scope of the United Nations, it condemned Soviet intervention, especially on an US alliance consensus bearing.¹⁴¹

In sum, by 1979, Chile's stance on international espionage and covert operations was inseparable from its internal authoritarian structure and anti-communist posture. As part of Operation Condor, the Chilean regime aligned itself with regional dictatorships and received indirect support from Western powers, particularly the United States. Covert actions served both domestic repression and broader ideological goals during the Cold War. Despite maintaining an official position of neutrality in certain diplomatic forums, Chile actively condemned Soviet interventions, notably in Afghanistan, reinforcing its strategic alliance with the Western bloc. This duality—internal repression and external condemnation of

¹³⁷UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. **2190th Meeting**: 7 and 9 January 1980. Retrieved from: <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/nl8/000/69/pdf/nl800069.pdf>. Accessed on: May 30th, 2025.

¹³⁸*Ibidem*.

¹³⁹UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. **2190th Meeting**: 7 and 9 January 1980. Retrieved from: <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/nl8/000/69/pdf/nl800069.pdf>. Accessed on: May 30th, 2025.

¹⁴⁰*Ibidem*.

¹⁴¹*Ibidem*.

authoritarianism—highlighted the regime's pragmatic use of international discourse to legitimize its own survival mechanisms.

3.2 THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Congo - officially the Republic of the Congo - is one of the member states in the United Nations, admitted on 20th of June, 1960. In 1970, Congo, then Brazzaville, changed its name to the People 's Republic of Congo, and on 15 November 1971 — to Congo.¹⁴²

From the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, the decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa led to several proxy confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as both superpowers vied for influence over the newly independent, non-aligned nations. The first of these confrontations took place in the former Belgian Congo, which achieved independence on June 30, 1960.¹⁴³

In matters of espionage, Congo may be deemed as a victim, specially at World War II, by the United States of America. It is important to mention that this situation was due to the abundance of the uranium metal, considered one of the deadliest metals on earth, and used to build atomic bombs. The Shinkolobwe mine in the Belgian Congo was the most important deposit of uranium yet discovered anywhere on earth, vital to the success of the Manhattan Project.

Given that Germany was also developing an atomic bomb, the United States urgently prioritized preventing Congolese uranium from falling into enemy hands. This critical mission was assigned to Washington's elite secret intelligence agents, who were sent undercover to colonial Africa to trace the uranium supply and identify Nazi collaborators.¹⁴⁴

Furthermore, due to the fear of another Communist-aligned nation emerging after what happened in Vietnam, The United States made repeated efforts to establish a stable, pro-Western government in the Congo by funding pro-Western candidates and engaging in vote-buying strategies. The Republic of Congo, as well as Mobutu - second president of the

¹⁴² UNITED NATIONS. **Member States**. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states>. Accessed on: May 24th, 2025.

¹⁴³ OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN. **The Congo, Decolonization, and the Cold War, 1960–1965**. Retrieved from: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/congo-decolonization>. Accessed on: May 25th, 2025.

¹⁴⁴ UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW. **Network on Intelligence and security practices in African countries**. Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81B00401R000600190013-5.pdf>. Accessed on: May 28th, 2025.

Democratic Republic of the Congo - proved at that time, to be a devoted ally against Communist infiltration in Africa.¹⁴⁵

Following independence in 1960, the Congolese government created several small police units to uphold order and safeguard state security. The first of these, the Sûreté Nationale, was replaced in 1969 by the National Documentation Center, which was later reorganized multiple times under President Mobutu's direction.¹⁴⁶

In matters of the vision of Congo in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, due to being a loyal supporter in the United States of America's political position, it is possible to state that Congo was against and despised that historical episode.¹⁴⁷

During World War II, Congo's abundant uranium reserves attracted significant US intelligence operations aimed at blocking Nazi access. Covert American agents monitored uranium shipments and pursued collaborators within colonial Africa. Subsequently, as a steadfast ally of the United States, Congo firmly condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, taking a clear stance against Soviet moves during the Cold War.¹⁴⁸

3.3 GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

In the aftermath of the German military leader's surrender in May 1945, the German state ceased to exist, with its sovereign authority being passed on to the victorious Allied Powers, namely the Soviet Union (USSR), the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) and France. With the intent of occupation, the former country was divided into four zones, with the American, British and French zones composing the western two-thirds of the territory, while the Soviet zone comprised the eastern third, which included the capital of the former German Reich, Berlin.¹⁴⁹

Formed in 1949, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), also known as Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR) or East Germany, is a socialist state established by the Soviet

¹⁴⁵*Ibidem.*

¹⁴⁶UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW. **Network on Intelligence and security practices in African countries.**

Retrieved from:

<https://www.gla.ac.uk/research/az/nispac/listofafricanintelligenceagencies/#congo%2Cdemocraticrepublicofthe>
Accessed on: May 28th, 2025.

¹⁴⁷*Ibidem.*

¹⁴⁸UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW . **Network on Intelligence and security practices in African countries.**

Retrieved from:

<https://www.gla.ac.uk/research/az/nispac/listofafricanintelligenceagencies/#congo%2Cdemocraticrepublicofthe>
Accessed on: May 28th, 2025.

¹⁴⁹BRITANNICA. **The era of partition.** Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/The-era-of-partition>. Accessed on: May 17th, 2025.

Union in the East region of Germany. Its capital Berlin paints a significant imagery of the Cold War divide, with the Berlin Wall, a guarded concrete barrier that encircles West Berlin since 1961, keeping it separate from East Berlin and the whole of the GDR.¹⁵⁰

Constructed due to a large number of migrants from East Germany to West Germany, the building of the Wall was a decisive turning point against this movement. Closing the last remaining route to the West in Berlin, it cut off the contact between the now divided nations and cemented a social, political and economical chasm.¹⁵¹

Moreover, the Berlin Wall also serves a pivotal role in Eastern Germany's espionage landscape, given that it created a physical barrier which complicates intelligence gathering for foreign agents. Amidst a battleground for intelligence operations, the Ministry for State Security (*Ministerium für Staatssicherheit*), commonly known as Stasi, became one of the most notorious organizations for surveillance, being infiltrated in every aspect of East German society.¹⁵²

With a primary objective to root out dissent and maintain the governmental control over the population, it also has a crucial position in countering Western intelligence agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from the U.S.A, the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the West German *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND). [5] Stasi's effectiveness became noticeable under the directorship of Erich Mielke, who became its director in 1957 and still remains in the position.¹⁵³

Furthermore, outside of its internal affairs, the foreign surveillance and intelligence gathering aspects of the agency happens through its Main Administration for Foreign Intelligence (*Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* - HVA), with most of its activities being directed towards the West German government and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With Markus Wolf as its chief of foreign operations since 1958, the Stasi managed to infiltrate several parts of West Germany's military, government and intelligence services, amounting to the resignation of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt when one of his top aides, Günter Guillaume, was discovered to be an East German spy in April 1975.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰DEUTSCHLAND.DE. **The GDR - what life was like for people in East Germany from 1949 to 1990.**

Retrieved from: <https://www.deutschland.de/en/topic/culture/gdr-east-germany>. Accessed on: May 17th, 2025.

¹⁵¹STIFTUNG BERLINER MAUER. **Flight & Division.** Retrieved from: <https://www.stiftung-berliner-mauer.de/en/topics/flight-division>. Accessed on: May 17th, 2025.

¹⁵²*Ibidem.*

¹⁵³THE DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS. **Espionage Activities in Eastern Germany during the Cold War:**

Unveiling a Web of Intrigue. Retrieved from: <https://www.thediplomaticaffairs.com/2023/08/17/espionage-activities-in-eastern-germany-during-the-cold-war-unveiling-a-web-of-intrigue/>. Accessed on: May 17th, 2025.

¹⁵⁴*Ibidem.*

Besides its human intelligence, the Stasi also utilizes means of signal intelligence for its information gathering, being able to listen into every phone in both East and West German, whilst also targeting specific individuals whenever their lines became busy and Government lines in the far war Western-German capital of Bonn in the Rhineland.¹⁵⁵

Concerning its politics, East Germany stands as a strong ally of the Soviet Union, and also as a signatory of the Warsaw Pact. The Treaty was established on May 14th, 1955, regarding a mutual-defense organization - Warsaw Treaty Organization - composed originally of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Albania, which withdrew in 1968.¹⁵⁶

The treaty provides for a unified military command and for the maintenance of Soviet military units on the territories of the other participating states. However, it is important to notice that the Warsaw Pact stands as a defense agreement, with the countries involved not being contractually obligated to help the attack of outside nations from the Treaty's members.¹⁵⁷

In 1978, world politics paid close attention to the developments in Afghanistan, when the Saur Revolution, led by leftist military forces under Nur Mohammad Taraki, overthrew Afghan President Mohammad Daud Khan, creating a new government. This government was composed of the Marxist-Leninist political parties, the People's (Khalq) Party and the Banner (Parcham) Party, forged close ties with the Soviet Union whilst facing strong resistance from the Afghan population, who opposed the regime's purges and social reforms.¹⁵⁸

This popular discontent led to the emergence of insurgencies by tribal and urban groups known as the mujahideen, which intensified following the Soviet intervention in December 1979, when 30,000 Soviet troops took control of the country. The intervention created a turning point in Cold War politics, with representative nations from both sides coming forward to speak or act on the matter.¹⁵⁹

In regards to its political allied actions, the East German government, under chairman Erich Honecker, was one of the first and most vocal supporters, especially amidst the Warsaw Pact nations, of the Soviet Union's actions, whilst also fearing the diplomatic response from

¹⁵⁵SCHAEFER, Bernd. **Stasi Intelligence on NATO**. Retrieved from: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/108634/04_Stasi_Intelligence.pdf. Accessed on: May 17th, 2025.

¹⁵⁶*Ibidem*.

¹⁵⁷*Ibidem*.

¹⁵⁸BRITANNICA. **Afghan War**. Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghan-War>. Accessed on: May 15th, 2025.

¹⁵⁹*Ibidem*.

Western nations which vehemently condemned the intervention.¹⁶⁰ Although East Germany's support remained unwavering in both intelligence gathering and military operations, the Western response became a point of discomfort, with its internal reporting devoting more space to the need of detenté, arms control negotiations, and its usual businesses.¹⁶¹

Despite its internal concerns, the GDR defended the Soviet actions in its official statements, framing the intervention as an eastern response to NATO's developments in the Middle East and also criticized the western involvement in the region's politics.¹⁶² Thus, considering its advantageous position as a nation regarding matters of espionage and its tools for surveillance and intelligence gathering, East Germany portrays an important part in Cold War relations, being a decisive force to the Eastern Bloc.¹⁶³

3.4 THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

The Arab Republic of Egypt approaches the 1980s in a uniquely sensitive position, both regionally and globally. Following the landmark Camp David Accords of 1978 and the subsequent Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979, Cairo had realigned its foreign policy orientation in a manner that distinguishes it from much of the Arab world and from its previous commitments during the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Officially, Egypt has condemned foreign espionage and covert interference in the affairs of sovereign nations. In its public diplomacy, particularly at multilateral fora like the United Nations, Egypt positioned itself as a proponent of international legal norms and a critic of great-power subversion in the Global South. This posture allowed Cairo to maintain credibility among Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members, even as its bilateral relations grew increasingly aligned with the United States.¹⁶⁴

Yet, beneath this public rhetoric, Egypt's stance on espionage was highly conditional and informed by its own national security imperatives. The Egyptian intelligence services – most notably the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) – were deeply involved in both

¹⁶⁰BRITANNICA. **Warsaw Pact**. Retrieved from:<https://www.britannica.com/event/Warsaw-Pact>. Accessed on: May 17th, 2025.

¹⁶¹MCADAMS, A. James. **East Germany and Detente: Building Authority After the Wall**. Retrieved from: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/east-germany-and-detente/5190BEA94E7BFFA2AE09F0F94F0BCC10>. Accessed on: May 17th, 2025.

¹⁶²*Ibidem*.

¹⁶³ALTERNATE HISTORY. **East Germans send troops to Afghanistan to aid the Soviets**. Retrieved from: <https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/east-germany-sends-troops-to-afghanistan-to-aid-the-soviets.539173/>. Accessed on: May 17th, 2025.

¹⁶⁴KERR, Malcolm H. **Sadat and the Soviet Union: The Death of an Alliance**. International Journal of Middle East Studies, v. 14, n. 3, 1982.

defensive and offensive covert operations, particularly in relation to Israel and, increasingly, to regional adversaries suspected of supporting subversive movements. Egypt had long maintained an active intelligence apparatus, dating back to its confrontations with Israel and its engagements during the Arab Cold War¹⁶⁵. During Sadat's presidency, these operations shifted focus from pan-Arab revolutionary causes to regime preservation and strategic alignment with Western powers.¹⁶⁶

The shift was especially pronounced after the 1977-1979 period, in which Egypt pursued peace with Israel. The Camp David Accords, which concluded in the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, not only realigned Egypt geopolitically but also introduced new intelligence-sharing arrangements with the United States. American and Egyptian cooperation in security and intelligence matters deepened, particularly around shared interests such as countering Soviet influence, monitoring Libyan activities under Muammar al-Gaddafi, and safeguarding the Red Sea and Suez Canal from potential destabilization.¹⁶⁷

Nevertheless, Egypt remained wary of foreign espionage within its own borders. The Egyptian state maintained a tightly controlled security environment, particularly vigilant against suspected Soviet infiltration, which was a recurring concern in the aftermath of Sadat's 1972 expulsion of Soviet advisors. The regime was equally alert to domestic political dissidents, especially leftist factions and Islamist opposition groups, some of which were believed to receive external ideological or material support. Covert surveillance, infiltration, and information control thus formed a key part of Egypt's internal security strategy, even as it condemned such practices when conducted by foreign powers against itself or its allies.¹⁶⁸

Egypt's nuanced position was further complicated by its regional posture. While Cairo criticized Soviet intelligence activities – especially those tied to Moscow's support for radical movements and client states – its opposition was not necessarily extended to all forms of covert engagement. Egyptian security officials collaborated with American and Jordanian counterparts in tracking Palestinian militancy, and there is evidence to suggest informal understandings with Israeli intelligence on matters of mutual concern, particularly after the normalization process

¹⁶⁵The Arab Cold War was a period of political rivalry during the mid-20th century, primarily between conservative monarchies like Saudi Arabia and revolutionary republics like Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser. It reflected a broader ideological divide within the Arab world between pro-Western, traditional regimes and Arab nationalist, often socialist, governments aligned with the Soviet bloc. The conflict played out through propaganda, regional alliances, and proxy wars, especially in countries like Yemen and Lebanon.

¹⁶⁶GOLDSCHMIDT, Arthur Jr. **Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State**. Boulder: Westview Press, 2008.

¹⁶⁷DESSOUKI, Ali E. Hillal. **Sadat and the United States: The Legacy of Camp David**. *Middle East Journal*, v. 36, n. 1, 1982.

¹⁶⁸SADEK, Adel. **Egypt and the Soviet Union: A Political Divorce**. *Middle East Review*, v. 12, n. 2, 1980.

had begun. These arrangements, though rarely acknowledged publicly, reflected Egypt's evolving conception of national security as increasingly interwoven with Western-led frameworks for regional stability.¹⁶⁹

Regarding the Soviet intervention on Afghanistan, under the leadership of President Anwar Sadat, Egypt embraced a pragmatic and strategically pro-Western stance, shifting away from its earlier Soviet alliance and opting for a path of diplomatic reconciliation with Israel, economic liberalization, and political alignment with the United States. This shift had profound implications for Egypt's regional relationships, international alliances, and its posture within the United Nations.¹⁷⁰

In the context of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Egypt's position is unequivocal: it regards the intervention as a grave breach of international law and a dangerous escalation of Cold War tensions. As a prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement that has nevertheless deepened its ties with the United States, Egypt condemns the Soviet action as a violation of Afghan sovereignty and as an example of the kind of hegemonic behavior that destabilizes regional security and undermines the principle of national self-determination. Cairo's stance reflects not only solidarity with the Afghan people but also a broader ideological rejection of Soviet military adventurism in the Islamic world.^{171 172}

This opposition is further cemented by Egypt's own historical experience. Having been a recipient of Soviet military and economic aid during the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt grew increasingly disillusioned with the limitations of that relationship, particularly after the 1967 defeat in the Six-Day War against Israel¹⁷³, and the subsequent Soviet reluctance to support a decisive Egyptian military posture. The final rupture came under Sadat, who expelled Soviet advisors in 1972 and gradually aligned Egypt with the Western camp. Thus, Cairo views the

¹⁶⁹STEIN, Kenneth W. **Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace**. New York: Routledge, 1990.

¹⁷⁰GOLDSCHMIDT, Arthur Jr. **Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State**. Boulder: Westview Press, 2008.

¹⁷¹KERR, Malcolm H. **Sadat and the Soviet Union: The Death of an Alliance**. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v. 14, n. 3, 1982.

¹⁷²UNITED NATIONS. **General Assembly - Sixth Emergency Special Session (1980): Resolution ES-6/2**. New York: UN, 1980. Retrieved from: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/ES-6/2>. Accessed on: 20 May 2025.

¹⁷³The Six-Day War was a brief but pivotal conflict fought in June 1967 between Israel and the neighboring Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. In just six days, Israel launched a preemptive strike and won a decisive victory, capturing the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Golan Heights. The war significantly reshaped the Middle East and intensified the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Soviet incursion into Afghanistan not as an isolated event but as the continuation of a broader pattern of interventionism that Egypt has deliberately chosen to reject.¹⁷⁴

Thus, on the international stage, Egypt navigated the complexities of being an Arab state that had signed a peace treaty with Israel while continuing to advocate for the rights of Muslim and Third World nations. The Egyptian government sought to reaffirm its commitment to Arab solidarity and Islamic values, even as its foreign policy orientation diverged from that of more radical or Soviet-aligned regimes. Within this context, the Afghan crisis offered Egypt an opportunity to assert moral leadership in the Islamic world by defending the sovereignty of a Muslim-majority country against foreign occupation, thereby reinforcing its position as a prominent regional actor.

Egypt's stance also aligned with that of the United States and other Western powers that condemned the Soviet invasion in both the UN Security Council and General Assembly. This alignment provided Cairo with diplomatic leverage, enabling it to position itself as a potential mediator between East and West. Nonetheless, this role required careful rhetorical balance; Egypt aimed to avoid the perception of serving merely as a proxy for U.S. interests. Instead, it framed its opposition to the Soviet intervention in terms of universal principles such as non-intervention, national sovereignty, and the inviolability of borders – core tenets of the UN Charter and the international order.

In conclusion, Egypt's foreign and intelligence policies in the early 1980s reflect a complex balance between public commitment to international norms and pragmatic security interests. While publicly opposing foreign intervention and espionage, Egypt actively engaged in covert operations to safeguard national interests, especially in collaboration with Western allies. Its condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan underscored a strategic realignment toward the United States, allowing Egypt to position itself as both a regional leader in the Islamic world and a credible partner in the emerging global order.


3.5 REPUBLIC OF INDIA

The Republic of India is a country located in the southern region of Asia. It is bathed by the Indian Ocean and shares its borders with Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan,

¹⁷⁴KERR, Malcolm H. **Sadat and the Soviet Union: The Death of an Alliance.** International Journal of Middle East Studies, v. 14, n. 3, 1982.

and Burma. It has a population of roughly 681,248,383¹⁷⁵ and a territory of over 3 million square kilometers,¹⁷⁶ making it one of the largest countries in the world.

Source: Maps of India.¹⁷⁷



Map of India in 1979.

Gaining its independence from the British empire in 1947, the nation was left in a really delicate situation which ultimately led to tensions with its neighbour Pakistan for the control of the Kashmir region on the country's northwest.¹⁷⁸ This specific conflict has been left unresolved since the independence days, which sparked a cold war between the two now nuclear armed nations.^{179/180}

As one of the 51 founding members of the United Nations in 1945,¹⁸¹ India's geopolitical position has played a significant role in shaping regional dynamics. The country

¹⁷⁵MACROTRENDS. **India Population 1950-2025**. Retrieved from: <https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/ind/india/population>. Accessed May 17th, 2025.

¹⁷⁶NATIONAL PORTAL OF INDIA. **Profile**. Retrieved from: <https://www.india.gov.in/india-glance/profile>. Accessed May 17th, 2025.

¹⁷⁷MAPS OF INDIA. **shared-relief-map-of-india-1979**. Retrieved from: <https://www.maps-of-india.com/india-relief-map/shared-relief-map-of-india-1979/attachment/shared-relief-map-of-india-1979/>. Accessed May 17th, 2025.

¹⁷⁸VOX. **The conflict in Kashmir, explained**. Published on March 21st, 2019. Retrieved from: https://youtu.be/cyayif_nla8?si=mpbfTIKcyArmRi5L. Accessed May 18th, 2025.

¹⁷⁹THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE. **Pakistan Country Spotlight**. Retrieved from: <https://www.nti.org/countries/pakistan/>. Accessed May 18th, 2025.

¹⁸⁰BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION. **SMILING BUDDHA: INDIA'S FIRST NUCLEAR TEST**. Retrieved from: <https://bbc.com/audio/play/w3cswsqn>. Accessed May 18th, 2025.

¹⁸¹UNITED NATIONS. **Founding Member States**. Retrieved from: <https://research.un.org/en/unmembers/founders>. Accessed May 29th, 2025.

is one of the most prominent members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)¹⁸², a position that greatly influences its stance on geopolitics. As a nation that fought intensely for its own independence, India views non-alignment not only as a path to economic development and the preservation of sovereignty but also as an extension of its nationalism and a means of exercising freedom of action in a polarized world.¹⁸³

However, despite its non-aligned status, the country maintained a close diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union. India's relationship with the USSR became a critical strategic endeavor in regional geopolitics, especially after its neighbor Pakistan started strengthening its ties with the West.¹⁸⁴ It is important to note, however, that this alliance was a strategic diplomatic collaboration based on mutual interest and did not result in India joining the Warsaw Pact or any major bloc, as that would have contradicted its non-aligned status.

In regards to espionage activities, post-colonial India was the stage for an intense influence battle between the CIA and the KGB. In the early stages of the Cold War, western intelligence agencies conducted a series of operations in the country with the mission of steering Indian public opinion in a pro-Western direction. In consideration of the country's non-aligned state, the USSR likewise saw the nation as an important asset for undermining western influence in the global south.¹⁸⁵

Seeking to establish an Intelligence Bureau and improve national security, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru — though not fully trusting or willing to allow external powers to influence the country's internal politics — secretly consolidated intelligence ties with Britain and the United States. This collaboration included intelligence gathering, analysis, and personnel training.¹⁸⁶ With the growing influence of communist movements across the country, Western powers and India's intelligence agencies closely monitored any related developments.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸²The Non-Aligned Movement is a group of countries that chose not to align with either the U.S. or the USSR during the Cold War. Founded in 1961, it promotes independence, neutrality, and peaceful coexistence. It mainly consists of developing nations and countries that recently achieved their sovereignty.

¹⁸³HARSHE, Rajen. **India's Non-Alignment: An Attempt at Conceptual Reconstruction**. Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 25, no. 7/8, 1990, pp. 399–405. JSTOR. Retrieved from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4395968>. Accessed May 26th, 2025.

¹⁸⁴CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. **Indo-Soviet Relations**. December 4th, 1972. Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130127-2.pdf>. Accessed May 29th, 2025.

¹⁸⁵MCGARR, Paul M. **Spying in South Asia: Britain, the United States, and India's Secret Cold War**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024.

¹⁸⁶*ibidem*

¹⁸⁷FOREIGN POLICY MAGAZINE. **How the Cold War Forged India's Intelligence Setup**. Retrieved from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/29/india-us-britain-intelligence-cold-war-spying-south-asia-review/>. Accessed May 26th, 2025.

The 1960s were marked by the Sino-Indian War. During this conflict, India received substantial intelligence support from the CIA, which conducted operations near Tibet and provided training and logistical aid to the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB). In return, India allowed the CIA to operate from its territory and granted access to its airspace for surveillance missions over Chinese forces.¹⁸⁸

In parallel, the KGB would also deeply infiltrate Indian politics, establishing connections within all major branches of government.¹⁸⁹ The USSR further reinforced its alliance with India by supporting its position in the conflict with Pakistan and eventually formalizing cooperation through the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation in 1971.¹⁹⁰

As CIA interventions in India and other foreign nations gradually became public, Indian public opinion shifted into a state of growing paranoia and opposition toward the agency. Shortly after the death of Prime Minister Nehru in 1964, this period of cooperation with the West came to an end.¹⁹¹ In the years that followed, Indo-Soviet collaboration became increasingly robust and institutionalized, with India's military forces becoming heavily dependent on Soviet support and investment.¹⁹²

In conclusion, India's foreign policy reflects a balancing act between its identity as a sovereign, non-aligned nation and its strategic partnership with the Soviet Union — shaped largely by ongoing tensions in neighboring regions, particularly the Kashmir conflict. In the realm of espionage, although initially receiving Western support in developing its intelligence infrastructure, the country soon became a battleground for influence between the KGB and the CIA, ultimately fostering widespread distrust among both the Indian government and the public toward foreign Western interference.

¹⁸⁸MCGARR, Paul M. **Spying in South Asia: Britain, the United States, and India's Secret Cold War**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024.

¹⁸⁹*ibidem*

¹⁹⁰EMBASSY OF INDIA MOSCOW. **INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF 1971 50th ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATION**. August 9th, 2021. Retrieved from: https://indianembassy-moscow.gov.in/pdf/Indo%20Soviet%20Treaty_2021.pdf. Accessed May 28th, 2025.

¹⁹¹MCGARR, Paul M. **Spying in South Asia: Britain, the United States, and India's Secret Cold War**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024.

¹⁹²CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. **THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA-RUSSIA DEFENCE COOPERATION AND ITS GRADUAL DECLINE**. Retrieved from: <https://csm.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Muhammad-Taimur-Fahad-Khan-ETHE-EVOLUTION-OF-INDIA-RUSSIA-DEFENCE-COOPERATION-AND-ITS-GRADUAL-DECLINE.pdf>. Accessed May 29th 2025.

3.6 THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

The Islamic Republic of Iran entered the 1980's as a unique political entity rooted in Islamic ideology and a rejection of superpower influence. Positioned at the crossroads of regional and global power struggles, Iran adopted a foreign policy that prioritized independence, anti-imperialism, and support for Muslim self-determination. This approach not only shaped its stance during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan but also defined its broader efforts to challenge both Western and Eastern hegemonies in the post-revolutionary era.

At the dawning days of the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, The Islamic Republic of Iran was going through a profound transformation in its domestic and foreign policy orientation. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, which overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy and established a theocratic republic under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, marked a radical departure from Iran's previous alignment with Western powers – particularly the United States – and introduced a new political order predicated on Islamic governance and anti-imperial sovereignty. This ideological shift fundamentally reoriented Iran's position in the international system and reshaped its relationships with both regional and global actors.¹⁹³

In the wake of its own revolution, Iran viewed the conflict in Afghanistan through a lens shaped by revolutionary principles, national security imperatives, and its complex relationship with both the Soviet Union and the United States. While the Islamic Republic shared with Marxist governments a critique of Western imperialism, particularly U.S. interventionism, it remained ideologically and geopolitically opposed to the atheistic communism branded by the USSR. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 thus presented Iran with a deeply problematic scenario: an infringement upon the sovereignty of a fellow Muslim-majority nation by a superpower whose ideology is antithetical to Iran's confessional¹⁹⁴ Islamic State values.¹⁹⁵

This particular set of circumstances left the Iranian government in a position of independence amidst the conflict – not aligned with the East or the West –, a posture that mirrored its overall post-revolution stance. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran adopted a foreign policy stance that explicitly rejected alignment with either of the two dominant Cold War blocs.

¹⁹³HALLIDAY, Fred. **Iranian Foreign Policy since the Revolution**. World Today, v. 38, n. 1, p. 12–17, 1982.

¹⁹⁴A confessional State consists of a State that openly favours one religion over others – it's the opposite of a secular State.

¹⁹⁵KEDDIE, Nikki R. **Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution**. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.

This non-alignment, however, was not a mere continuation of the Shah's earlier strategy of balancing between superpowers; it emerged instead as a doctrinal and revolutionary rejection of both Western capitalist imperialism and Eastern communist atheism. Guided by the ideological principles of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic presented itself as an entirely new political entity – neither East nor West, but Islamic – whose legitimacy derived from divine authority and popular revolution rather than superpower patronage.¹⁹⁶

Iran's opposition to the United States was immediate and vehement. The revolutionary government regarded Washington not only as the former sponsor of the overthrown Pahlavi monarchy but as a symbol of global imperialism and moral corruption. The seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and the prolonged hostage crisis that followed were not merely retaliatory acts but ideological declarations – they signaled a complete rupture with American influence in the region and a refusal to engage with the prevailing norms of Cold War diplomacy. U.S. support for the Shah's brutal internal security apparatus and its role in the 1953 coup that restored Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power were frequently invoked by Iran to justify its anti-Americanism.¹⁹⁷¹⁹⁸

At the same time, the Islamic Republic remained deeply distrustful of the Soviet Union. Although Moscow initially viewed the Iranian Revolution with cautious optimism – hoping it might displace Western influence in the region – it soon became apparent that Iran's new leaders viewed Soviet communism as a grave ideological threat. The Islamic Republic condemned Marxism-Leninism as an atheistic doctrine antithetical to Islam and denounced Soviet repression of Muslim populations in Central Asia.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 only deepened Iran's antagonism toward the USSR. Tehran interpreted the intervention not merely as a violation of Afghan sovereignty but as an act of aggression against the Muslim world, reinforcing its conviction that the Soviet Union was no less imperialistic than the United States.¹⁹⁹

Thus, Iran entered the 1980s in a state of pronounced isolation. It had severed ties with Washington, maintained only strained and cautious relations with Moscow, and was isolated by many of its Arab neighbors due to its revolutionary rhetoric and calls for Islamic uprising. Iran's leadership, far from attempting to insert itself into Cold War alignments, sought to forge

¹⁹⁶HALLIDAY, Fred. **Iranian Foreign Policy since the Revolution**. World Today, v. 38, n. 1, p. 12–17, 1982.

¹⁹⁷*Ibidem*.

¹⁹⁸KEDDIE, Nikki R. **Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution**. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.

¹⁹⁹RUBIN, Barnett R. **The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System**. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

a third path based on the export of its revolutionary model. This included support for Islamic movements across the region and a rhetorical commitment to the oppressed of the world. The Islamic Republic claimed to speak not just for Iran but for all Muslims and anti-colonial peoples resisting domination by either superpower.²⁰⁰

With this in mind, the Iranian government articulated a principled stance grounded in opposition to both hegemonies and violations of Muslim self-determination. It affirmed its commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, condemning the Soviet intervention as a breach of international law and an affront to Islamic sovereignty. This position aligned with the Islamic Republic's post-revolutionary foreign policy, which emphasized solidarity with oppressed Muslim communities and resistance to foreign domination, whether from capitalist or communist powers.

At the same time, Iran's leadership remained aware of the country's internal instability and growing international isolation in the aftermath of the revolution. The U.S. embassy crisis, ongoing since November 1979, has significantly strained Iran's relations with the West, while its ideological stance has also unsettled regional monarchies and neighboring regimes.

Concerning international espionage and covert operations, in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran adopted an unambiguous and hostile posture toward the matter, grounded in both ideological convictions and historical grievances. The revolutionary leadership regarded covert interference by foreign powers not merely as an affront to national sovereignty, but as an existential threat to the Islamic Republic itself.

This position was shaped by Iran's lived experience of foreign subversion, particularly the 1953 CIA and MI6-backed coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, which remained a foundational trauma in the post-revolutionary political consciousness. As a result, the Islamic Republic cultivated a doctrine that conflated espionage with imperialism, denouncing covert operations as instruments of neocolonial domination and as tools used by hostile powers to undermine Islamic governance.^{201/202}

The 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and the subsequent detention of 52 American diplomats and personnel for 444 days, was not only a retaliation against the perceived threat of another foreign-backed coup, but also a symbolic act of revolutionary justice. The so-

²⁰⁰KEDDIE, Nikki R. **Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution**. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.

²⁰¹KEDDIE, Nikki R. **Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution**. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.

²⁰²ABRAHAMIAN, Ervand. **Iran Between Two Revolutions**. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.

called “den of espionage” became a national metaphor for the hidden hand of American interventionism. Documents recovered from the embassy by Iranian students appeared to confirm the presence of CIA operatives and their involvement in monitoring revolutionary groups and political developments, further validating the regime’s narrative of perpetual Western espionage. The Islamic Republic portrayed its actions not as violations of diplomatic norms, but as defensive measures against a power that had repeatedly subverted Iran’s sovereignty.²⁰³

Within this framework, Iran not only rejected foreign espionage but institutionalized a wide-reaching counterintelligence apparatus to detect and suppress internal and external threats. The Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, established in the early 1980s, became the principal organ for both domestic surveillance and the identification of foreign covert operations. This included countering suspected CIA and Mossad operatives, as well as monitoring leftist, monarchist, and ethnic separatist movements that were believed to receive external support. The regime’s suspicion extended to Western media, NGOs, diplomatic personnel, and even certain clerical networks, all of which were viewed through the lens of potential espionage.²⁰⁴

Equally, Iran's leadership expressed deep suspicion toward the Soviet Union’s intelligence activities. Despite both countries sharing a mutual hostility toward the United States, ideological and geopolitical mistrust persisted. The aforementioned USSR’s atheist doctrine, its historical record of suppressing Muslim populations, and its recent invasion of Afghanistan made it, in the eyes of Tehran, no less of a covert aggressor than the United States. Iranian authorities were decisively aware of Soviet attempts to penetrate the revolutionary state through their remaining networks from the Pahlavi era and through indirect engagement with Iranian leftist groups such as the Tudeh Party, which were later outlawed and severely repressed for alleged collaboration with Soviet intelligence.²⁰⁵

In sum, in the aftermath of its 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran positioned itself as a fiercely independent actor on the global stage, rejecting both Western and Eastern domination. Its response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan reflected a broader commitment to defending Muslim sovereignty and resisting imperial influence from any source. While navigating internal upheaval and international isolation, Iran remained steadfast

²⁰³TAKEYH, Ray. **Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

²⁰⁴*Ibidem*.

²⁰⁵ABRAHAMIAN, Ervand. **Iran Between Two Revolutions**. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.

in promoting its revolutionary ideals and opposing foreign interference—whether through military intervention or covert operations. This principled yet pragmatic stance would come to define Iran’s foreign policy throughout the early 1980s and beyond.

3.7 THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

The Republic of Turkey is a nation strategically positioned in the global relations of the Cold War – not quite European but not entirely Middle Eastern either. Many state that the geographical location of the country has been causing an identity crisis to the Turkish people till the modern times, considering that the nation grew receiving significant influence by both sides of the map.²⁰⁶

Similarly, it could not be so different when it came to how the cold war policies and propaganda influenced the nation. Cangül Örnek and Çağdas Üngör highlight in their paper “Turkey’s Cold War: Global Influences, Local Manifestations” the social context that an average person experiences living in turkey during this critical political global tension. The writers state that:

“A young Turkish boy visiting the İzmir International Fair in the mid-1950s would have found it difficult to choose a favorite between the Soviet pavilion, which displayed a model Sputnik, and the American pavilion, which promised its visitors the sight of the ‘magical’ TV set. By the late 1960s, he might have faced a similar dilemma upon entering a bookstore in Ankara, where he contemplated buying a ‘social realist’ novel instead of going to a downtown theatre to see the latest Hollywood movie. In the meantime, his friends might have been gathering at the campus of the Middle East Technical University (METU) – a model Western institution, where the language of instruction is English – to demonstrate against ‘American imperialism’.”²⁰⁷

Moreover, when the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, it was born inheriting the legacy from the Ottoman Empire, which was primarily marked by the modernization efforts of the Western model. During 1920, the country had an effort in prioritizing domestic policies to improve infrastructure, launching a Westernization campaign domestically.

However, during the war of independence (1919–1922) the nation received political and material support from its northern neighbor, Russia, which would later become the USSR.

²⁰⁶KADIOĞLU, Ayşe. **The paradox of Turkish nationalism and the construction of official identity.** *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 32, n. 2, p. 177–193, 1996.

²⁰⁷ÖRNEK, Cangül; ÜNGÖR, Çağdas. **Introduction: Turkey’s cold war: Global influences, local manifestations.** In: ÖRNEK, Cangül; ÜNGÖR, Çağdas (org.). *Turkey in the Cold War: Ideology and Culture.* London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. p. 1–18.

Therefore, posteriorly maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union throughout the years, with a few interferences during the second World War.²⁰⁸

In the context of the Cold War, it is particularly known that the use of secret intelligence had risen and was being used strategically by nations to gather information from its rivals. Although it is public knowledge that countries such as the USSR and the USA use espionage as a weapon, the concept of secret intelligence was not foreign to the republic of Turkey.

The first centralized intelligence agency of the nation, the National Security Service, Milli Emniyet Hizmeti, commonly known as MAH was founded by a top secret memorandum on January 6th, 1926, initially operating as a small unit within the army.²⁰⁹ However, by the end of that year, it had developed into a more sophisticated structure with four main divisions: the 'A Branch' handled espionage, 'B Branch' focused on counter-espionage, 'C Branch' dealt with propaganda, and 'D Branch' provided technical support.²¹⁰

During this period, Turkey maintained strong ties to western countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. For instance, the Anglo-American alliance set up multiple Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) stations to keep track of Soviet operations, demonstrating the importance of the Turkish espionage action to the West's interest.²¹¹ They became a key site for U.S. and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) espionage activities, including surveillance and signal intelligence operations targeting Soviet communications.²¹²

Nevertheless, mutual suspicion persisted despite formal alliances. Turkey frequently believed that its Western partners prioritized their own strategic agendas over Turkish security needs. Key events like the 1964's Johnson Letter and the 1974's U.S. arms embargo after Turkey's intervention in Cyprus deepened Ankara's distrust, prompting it to pursue a more autonomous approach in secret intelligence affairs.²¹³

Secondly, when it comes to Turkey's intervention and action on the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, it is crucial to acknowledge the nature of the Afghan-Turkish relations, dating

²⁰⁸*ibidem*

²⁰⁹KIRALP, Şevki. **Turkish Intelligence and the Cold War: the Turkish Secret Service, the US and the UK.** [S.l.]: [s.n.], 2021. p. 684–686.

²¹⁰*ibidem*

²¹¹KIRALP, Şevki. *Op. cit.*

²¹²GÖÇEK, Fatma Müge. **The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era.** London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.

²¹³KIRALP, Şevki. *Op. cit.*

back to the XVIII century Ottoman Empire. However, the official ties regarding the Republic of Turkey and the country of Afghanistan began in 1921.

The Turkey-Afghanistan Treaty, signed in Moscow, marked Afghanistan as the first country to recognize Turkey's national struggle for independence from Ottoman territory.²¹⁴ Subsequently, during the years prior to the invasion, Afghan rulers intended to maintain close relations with other Muslim countries, as a strategy to establish a program of economic modernization in the country, one of them being Turkey.²¹⁵

Furthermore, after the 1960's, the focus of East–West conflict started to shift from Europe and began moving towards Africa, East Asia and the Middle East.²¹⁶ Notably, although Turkey had an important role being a Middle Eastern representative in NATO, between 1970 and 1979 the country was experiencing a domestic political crisis that also significantly affected the country's foreign relations.²¹⁷ Thus, from 1973 onward, the subsequent governments were primarily focused on staying in power.

In addition, although they attempted to shift foreign policy directions, they lacked the stability and resources to craft or implement long-term strategies. Fragile coalitions and constant internal crises meant that foreign policy was often reactive and shaped more by internal chaos than by clear, strategic planning, and therefore lacking in taking major and direct action regarding the conflict in Afghanistan.

In 1979, in addition to the Turkish internal political crisis, the February 1979 Iranian Revolution left Turkey as the West's sole ally in the Northern Middle East, increasing its strategic importance as both a surveillance outpost and a buffer against potential Soviet expansion into the region. That being said, it is clear that the USA's concerns about regional security grew even more following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, especially considering that its only middle east ally was currently going through their own internal calamity.²¹⁸

During the Cold War, Turkey's strategic location and historical ties to both the West and the Soviet Union placed it at the heart of intense espionage activities. The country's intelligence services, working alongside Western allies like the USA and U.K., played a key role in monitoring Soviet communications and maintaining Western influence in the region.

²¹⁴EKŞİ, Muharrem. **Turkey's increasing role in Afghanistan.** *Journal of Global Analysis* (CESRAN), 2010.

²¹⁵NEWELL, Richard S. **Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.** *The World Today*, v. 36, n. 7, p. 250–258, 1980.

²¹⁶HALE, William. **Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774.** 3. ed. Londres: Routledge, 2012. eBook.

²¹⁷*ibidem*

²¹⁸HALE, William. **Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774.** 3. ed. Londres: Routledge, 2012. eBook.

However, while Turkey's espionage efforts expanded, its ability to respond to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was limited by its own political instability in the late 1970s. Despite Afghanistan's earlier recognition of Turkey's independence struggle and their long-standing ties, Turkey's weakened domestic situation prevented it from taking decisive action in the conflict, highlighting how internal turmoil constrained its influence during a pivotal moment in the Cold War.

3.8 THE REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA

The Republic of Venezuela, located in northern South America, was home to around 14 million people by the late 1970s. During this period, the country experienced rapid economic growth, largely fueled by its vast oil reserves. Oil exports played a central role in shaping Venezuela's economy and international presence. The capital city, Caracas, saw significant urban development as a result of this economic boom. Venezuela's natural resources and strategic location made it an important player in Latin American affairs during the Cold War era.

One of the main issues within the country were ongoing dictatorships and non-democratic elections since the year of 1908 after Juan Vicente Gómez took power of the country.²¹⁹ However, the 1970s marked an important step in the history of the country, as they ascended to democratic stability, with an oil-fueled economic growth, and nuanced foreign policy.

Initially, the election of Rafael Caldera, in 1969, of the Christian Democratic Party (COPEI), marked Venezuela's first peaceful democratic transfer of power between rival parties.²²⁰ Caldera's policies were considerably more flexible than his predecessor. Although Venezuela was a strong western ally, Caldeira still reopened diplomatic relations with several Eastern Bloc nations and re-established ties with Cuba in 1974.²²¹

Moreover, the economy of the country expanded in 1973, as the oil crisis—triggered by the Arab oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—dramatically increased Venezuela's revenue. Then, by 1976, President Carlos Andrés Pérez created Venezuela's first State-owned oil company, *Petróleos de Venezuela S.A*

²¹⁹UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Historical Office. **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: The Near East and Africa**. v. 8889. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1977.

²²⁰SKIDMORE, T. E.; SMITH, P. H. **Modern Latin America**. 8. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

²²¹*Ibidem*.

(PDVSA).²²² Even prior to this economic expansion, the USA was already interested in allying with Venezuela because of its large natural oil reserve, as they wanted to assure an adequate supply of petroleum, especially if there were to be a war, a concept not too distant.²²³

Now, with more international independence, and having to rely less on the North American superpower, its actions often did not appease the United States. For instance, the reaction to the 1973 coup in Chile, had Venezuela condemning the Pinochet regime – supported by the USA – and offered asylum to its political exiles.²²⁴ Nonetheless, the country continued to be Venezuela's main oil purchaser and strategic partner.²²⁵

Concerning the Cold War's common practice of covert operations, the assembly of covert operations and espionage within the country was also of high interest by the American government. During the 1960s and 1970s, specifically, there were many nations in South America open to communist ideals following the Cuban revolution.²²⁶ Therefore, their interest in Venezuela grew, as they needed to maintain their allyship in control to preserve their petroleum supply.

One of the biggest threats, both to the USA and the at the time West-ally Venezuelan policy, was the *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (FALN). The organization was a guerrilla group of revolutionaries deeply imbued with a military tradition, and was described as a Marxist-Leninist movement.²²⁷ FALN's objectives as a group were highlighted in their inaugural meeting on February 20th 1963, and it was listed as follows:

AIMS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMED FORCES (FALN)

The FALN is an institution at the service of the Country, the People, and the Venezuelan Revolution. Democratic and Nationalist, its aims are: 1. To enforce respect for national sovereignty and independence, the freedom and democratic life of the Venezuelan people. 2. To defend the national heritage, its integrity and wealth. 3. To support the authorities set up by the Revolution and to see that the laws made by them in accordance with their powers are carried out. 4. To protect the interest of

²²²HELLINGER, D. **Venezuela and the United States: From Monroe's Hemisphere to Petroleum's Empire.** Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011.

²²³ UNITED STATES Department of State. *Op. cit.*

²²⁴SKIDMORE, T. E.; SMITH. *Op. cit.*

²²⁵TSVETKOVA, N.; KHEIFETS, V.; SYTNIK, A.; TSVETKOV, I. **Venezuela in U.S. public diplomacy, 1950s–2000s: The Cold War, democratization, and the digitalization of politics.** *Cogent Social Sciences*, v. 5, n. 1, 2019.

²²⁶ORERO, Eudald Cortina. **Notes on the Guerrilla Experience in Venezuela (1958–1994).** In: *Latin American Guerrilla Movements.* London: Routledge, 2019. p. 45–53.

²²⁷GOTT, Richard. **Guerrilla Movements in Latin America.** Illustrated, reprint, revised ed. London: Seagull Books, 2008.

*the people, their property and institutions. 5. To set up a revolutionary, nationalist and democratic government.*²²⁸

Venezuela also has its own intelligence service that worked very closely with the CIA, the *Dirección de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevención* (DISIP) created in 1969 by President Caldera. The decision came with strong support from his counterparts in the United States, as well as the anti-communist Cuban exile movement, formed after the Cuban Revolution in Venezuela.²²⁹

Among the many roles of the institutions, it was primarily responsible for gathering and analyzing intelligence related to threats against the democratic regime posed by political opponents. DISIP also enforced intelligence policies targeting these individuals and had the authority to detain and interrogate those considered threats. Additionally, it had a financial division dedicated to investigating unlawful capital flows into and out of the country.²³⁰

Furthermore, as a strong ally of the United States of America, the nation fought against possible communist and soviet interference and occupation, which marked its ongoing distress with Cuba that, at the time, maintained a communist regime.²³¹ While most of the globe was concerned with the recent invasion of the USSR in Afghanistan, and its the possible repercussions, Venezuela was overloaded with its own national security troubles.

However, there was an underlying concern regarding the possible economic consequences that the exploration of petroleum in the Middle east could cause to the oil-fueled economic stability of Venezuela. Considering that the country was the primary source of oil in the international market, losing its position could imply a drastic downfall in its revenue.

Venezuela's democracy and economic boom made it a key player in Cold War geopolitics. However, its strategic oil reserves and domestic communist insurgency drew intense covert operations and espionage, especially from the USA, which sought to maintain its ally's stability. Even as the world was focused on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Venezuela faced its own security challenges, with internal surveillance by the DISIP and ongoing foreign interest in its affairs.

²²⁸GÓMEZ DE LA TORRE ROTTA, Andrés. *Servicios de inteligencia y democracia en América del Sur: ¿Hacia una segunda generación de reformas normativas?* *Agenda Internacional*, Lima, Año XVI, n. 27, p. 119–130, 2009. ISSN 1027-6750.

²²⁹MYERS, David J. *The Institutions of Intelligence in Venezuela: Lessons from 45 Years of Democracy*. Iberoamericana–Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, v. 33, n. 1, 2003.

²³⁰*ibidem*

²³¹BOERSNER, Demetrio. *Cuba and Venezuela: liberal and conservative possibilities*. In: *The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean*. London: Routledge, 2019. p. 91–105.

3.9 THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

In the late 70's, Vietnam was grappling with the aftermath of a war that had ravaged its land. As the last of America's personnel in South Vietnam boarded crowded boats and helicopters in an attempt to flee the country in April of 1975, North Vietnamese tanks crashed through the gates of the Presidential Palace in Saigon and a new, Socialist government was established.²³² The country underwent a period of significant political, social, and economic upheaval as it was rebuilding itself.

In 1978, Vietnam would invade and occupy Cambodia, ending the rule of the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge. In retaliation, China launched an offensive in early 1979 in what would become known as the Sino-Vietnamese War, which lasted about a month; Vietnam, however, continued to occupy Cambodia even after the withdrawal of Chinese troops from its land.²³³

During the war between North and South Vietnam, the Southern government had kept an Intelligence agency under the name of Central Intelligence Office, in order to gather information about the Viet Cong.²³⁴ This intelligence office included three main divisions: the Domestic Intelligence Bureau – which had a department for surveillance of domestic communist/enemy activities (Department K); a counterespionage department (Dept. U); and a political department e.g. on subversive political activities like coup d'etats and on the North Vietnamese government (Dept. Z) –, the Foreign Intelligence Bureau, and the National Inquiry Center, responsible for interrogation of prisoners, suspected communists, POWs.²³⁵

North Vietnam was not without its own intelligence organization, however. Conducted by the Lao Dong Party, the North Vietnamese intelligence and security operations were divided through three major government organs. The Bo Cong, or Ministry of Public Security, considered by CIA operatives to be the “sister or first cousin to the Soviet KGB and the communist Chinese Ministry of Public Security”²³⁶, was responsible for assigning personnel

²³²ASIA PACIFIC CURRICULUM. **Vietnam After the War**. Retrieved from:

<https://asiapacificcurriculum.ca/learning-module/vietnam-after-war>. Accessed on: March 29th, 2025.

²³³BAO TIN TUC. (18 February 2019). **Nghệ thuật chỉ đạo đấu tranh trong Cuộc chiến đấu bảo vệ biên giới phía Bắc**. Retrieved from: <https://baotintuc.vn/chinh-tri/nghe-thuat-chi-dao-dau-tranh-trong-cuoc-chien-dau-bao-ve-bien-gioi-phia-bac-20190218075647669.htm>. Accessed on: March 29th, 2025.

²³⁴HUY, Đức (2013). **Bên Thắng cuộc**. Viet Nam: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. ISBN 978-1-4840-4000-3.

²³⁵VIETNAM ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES. **Bách khoa toàn thư Việt Nam**. Retrieved from: <http://dictionary.bachkhoatoanthu.gov.vn/default.aspx?param=141FaWQ9MjU4MDQmZ3JvdXBpZD0zJmtpbmQ9JmtleXdvcmlQ9&page=2>. Accessed on: July 6th, 2014.

²³⁶NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND. **THE DRVN STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SERVICE**. Retrieved from: <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/d/the-drvn-strategic-intelligence-service.html>. Accessed on: March 29th, 2025.

abroad to serve as security officers and to collect intelligence and for detaining and interrogating prisoners of war.

The Research Agency, Cuc Nghien Cuu, was a subordinate component of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam armed forces General Staff under the Ministry of National Defense and was responsible for collecting and processing strategic intelligence, including foreign intelligence. Last but not least, the Security Directorate of the General Political Directorate in the Ministry of Defense (Cuc Bao Ve An Ninh) was responsible for security within North Vietnam's military establishment.²³⁷

The responsibility for the collection of strategic intelligence beyond the borders of Northern and Southern Vietnam, however, fell on the lap of the Foreign Intelligence Office (Office 76) of the Research Agency (CNC). Office 76 is responsible for supervising and monitoring the assignment of CNC officers to foreign countries, briefing North Vietnamese diplomatic personnel and trade and cultural delegations on intelligence requirements and levies requirements for personnel to attend and monitor conferences held for foreign visitors.²³⁸

The CIA – United States's intelligence agency – also had its fair share of involvement in the war in Vietnam. It participated in both the political and military aspects of the wars in Indochina,²³⁹ providing suggestions for political platforms, supporting candidates, using agency resources to refute electoral fraud charges, manipulating the certification of election results by the South Vietnamese National Assembly, and instituting the Phoenix Program. It worked particularly closely with the ethnic minority Montagnards, Hmong, and Khmer. There are 174 National Intelligence Estimates dealing with Vietnam, issued by the CIA after coordination with the U.S. intelligence community.²⁴⁰

Although there was no official statement from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, its socialist government constantly sided with the USSR and would openly support the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.²⁴¹ Vietnam's increasing closeness with the USSR in turn alarmed

²³⁷UNITED STATES. **WORLDWIDE REACTION TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN**. Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81B00401R000600190013-5.pdf>. Accessed on: March 29th, 2025.

²³⁸*Ibidem*.

²³⁹NSA ARCHIVE. **The CIA's Vietnam Histories**. Retrieved from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB284/>. Accessed on: May 29th, 2025.

²⁴⁰NIC. **NIC - Vietnam NIEs TOC**. Archived from the original on 6 March 2008. Retrieved from: https://web.archive.org/web/20080306110446/http://www.dni.gov/nic/foia_vietnam_content.html. Accessed on: May 29th, 2025.

²⁴¹BERLIN, Michael J. **India Supports Soviets' Afghan Position in U.N. Debate**. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/01/12/india-supports-soviets-afghan-position-in-un-debate/17dd1eb5-93f9-44bf-9f95-ecda7285843c/>. Accessed on: May 29th, 2025.

Chinese leadership, which resulted in the previously mentioned Sino-Vietnamese War. The country would also receive increasing Soviet military aid,²⁴² including intelligence and equipment, as well as troops deployed at the Sino-Soviet border as an act of showing support to Vietnam, as well as tying up Chinese troops.²⁴³

Increasing signs of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation also appeared during the summer of 1978, as Vietnam asked to become a member of Comecon. In addition, government sources in the United States reported that by August 1978 as many as 4,000 Soviet advisors were in Vietnam. During September 1978, the USSR began carrying out increased arms shipments to Vietnam, both by air and by sea, which included "aircraft, missiles, tanks, and munitions."²⁴⁴

Finally, all these signs of improving Soviet-Vietnamese relations came to fruition on 3 November 1978, when Vietnam and the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. There was no doubt that this treaty was aimed at China, since the sixth clause stated that Vietnam and the USSR would "immediately consult each other" if either is "attacked or threatened with attack... with a view to eliminating that threat." Reportedly, this treaty also included a secret protocol granting Soviet military forces access to Vietnam's "airfields and ports."¹³

In conclusion, Vietnam is a country that supported its reconstruction on the crutches of the Eastern bloc, and vehemently supported its members. It had greatly taken advantage of the collection of intelligence, both foreign and domestic, but had also suffered in the past from infiltration and espionage done by other nations, namely the United States of America. In its quest to rebuild itself, Vietnam would look for ways to both undermine the West and appraise the East.

3.10 FEDERAL REPUBLIC GERMANY

The Federal Republic of Germany (*Bundesrepublik Deutschland*), also known as West Germany, is a country located in Western Europe. It has a population of approximately 61

²⁴²WANG, Frances Yaping (2024). **The Art of State Persuasion: China's Strategic Use of Media in Interstate Disputes**. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780197757512.

²⁴³TTU. **Sino-Soviet Relations and the February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Conflict**. Archived from the original on 28 April 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/1996_Symposium/96papers/elleviet.php. Accessed on: May 29th, 2025.

²⁴⁴*Ibidem*.

million people²⁴⁵ and was established in the aftermath of World War II, following the dissolution of Nazi Germany.

Initially formed by three occupation zones controlled by Western Bloc countries — the British zone in the north, the French zone in the southwest, and the American zone in the southeast — West Germany gained sovereignty in 1955, becoming an independent nation. In the same month, it became a full member of NATO.^{246/247} Berlin, however, remained divided among the same three Western powers and the Soviet Union, with the West and Eastern sectors separated by the Berlin Wall.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ STATISTA. **Population in the former territories of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic from 1950 to 2016**. Retrieved from:

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1054199/population-of-east-and-west-germany/>. Accessed May 24th, 2025.

²⁴⁶ NATIONAL ARMY MUSEUM. **The Army and the occupation of Germany**. Retrieved from:

<https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/occupation-and-reconstruction-germany-1945-48>. Accessed May 23rd, 2025.

²⁴⁷ NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. **German reunification**. Retrieved from:

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_136311.htm#:~:text=NATO%20welcomed%20West%20Germany%20as,later%20on%2022%20May%201955. Accessed May 23rd, 2025.

²⁴⁸ EBSCO. **Germany's post WWII occupation**. Retrieved from: <https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/germanys-post-wwii-occupation#:~:text=The%20occupation%20gradually%20transitioned%20towards,in%20the%20region's%20political%20landscape>.

Source: NATO²⁴⁹



Germany's division before 1955

Even though being a full member of NATO, West Germany's foreign policy is oriented toward maintaining good relations with the Eastern Bloc, as this approach is considered essential to national security. Several factors contribute to this stance, including the country's geographic position as a dividing line between Western and Soviet-aligned nations, its delicate political and economic development following World War II, the presence of Soviet troops in East Germany and the hope of German reunification.²⁵⁰

These factors significantly influence West Germany's approach to foreign policy, as the nation tends to react with moderate caution and generally avoids involvement in conflicts in which it is not directly involved. At the same time, West Germany strongly supports the continuation of diplomatic dialogue on arms control with the USSR and stresses the importance of keeping communication channels between East and West open.²⁵¹

In matters of espionage, West Germany's intelligence operations are carried out by the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND). Established in 1956, the BND evolved from a previous semi-official intelligence framework, the Gehlen Organization, which had strong ties to the CIA —

²⁴⁹ NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. **THE WALL: A Border Through Germany.** Retrieved from: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/nato%20archives/20110803_expo-thewall-a-border-through-g.pdf. Accessed May 23rd 2025.

²⁵⁰ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. **WEST GERMANY: RELATIONS WITH THE USSR.** Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00287R000100370001-2.pdf>. Accessed May 24th, 2025.

²⁵¹ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. **Worldwide Reaction to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.** Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81B00401R000600190013-5.pdf>. Accessed May 22nd, 2025.

receiving funding, equipment, and operational support from the American agency.²⁵² Headquartered in Munich, the BND focuses heavily on communications intelligence and actively shares information with NATO agencies and other allied intelligence services.²⁵³

In the early stages of the Cold War, the primary task of the BND was to monitor the deployment of Soviet forces within the German Democratic Republic (GDR). During the 1960s, the agency began recruiting East Germans who frequently traveled across the country — such as truck drivers and railway employees — to gather intelligence on Soviet-controlled territory and report their findings to the West.²⁵⁴

Eventually, the organization entered a period of deep crisis as agents from the Stasi and other Soviet-aligned intelligence services successfully infiltrated West Germany and recruited double agents, leading to growing distrust in the BND-CIA collaboration.²⁵⁵ It is estimated that during this time, approximately 16,000 Soviet agents were active in West Germany, with around 80% of them being East German operatives.²⁵⁶

One of the most notable cases during this period was that of Günter Guillaume, a Stasi agent who served as the private secretary to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Guillaume spent years spying at the highest levels of West German politics. He was eventually arrested for espionage in 1974, but Chancellor Brandt took responsibility for the government's failure to detect the infiltration and ultimately chose to resign from office.²⁵⁷

In conclusion, West Germany usually approaches geopolitical developments with caution, striving to balance its relationships with both its Western allies and its Soviet neighbors. While situated in one of the most strategic regions of the Cold War, leaving the country vulnerable to Soviet espionage, it offers a valuable vantage point for the BND, CIA,

²⁵²CHILDS, David. **Intelligence Gathering in Cold War Germany**. Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 48, no. 3, 2013, pp. 617–24. JSTOR. Retrieved from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23488425>. Accessed May 26th, 2025.

²⁵³The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. **BND**. Encyclopedia Britannica, 17 Mar. 2025. Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/BND>. Accessed May 26th, 2025.

²⁵⁴CHILDS, David. **Intelligence Gathering in Cold War Germany**. Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 48, no. 3, 2013, pp. 617–24. JSTOR. Retrieved from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23488425>. Accessed May 26th, 2025.

²⁵⁵ADAMS, Jefferson. **Spying Among Friends: The Troubled Waters of the CIA and BND**. Retrieved from: <https://www.justsecurity.org/13995/spying-friends-troubled-waters-cia-bnd-jefferson-adams/>. Accessed May 27th, 2025.

²⁵⁶CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. **West Germany Spy Hysteria**. Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01314R000300620008-7.pdf>. Accessed May 27th, 2025.

²⁵⁷DEUTSCHE WELLE. **O espião comunista que derrubou Willy Brandt**. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/pt-br/como-um-espi%C3%A3o-comunista-derrubou-o-chanceler-willy-brandt/a-16762631>. Accessed May 27th, 2025.

and other Western agencies to conduct operations and gather firsthand intelligence from the other side of the Iron Curtain.

4 OBSERVER MEMBERS

While the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is formally composed of fifteen members – five permanent and ten non-permanent – its debates often include the participation of observer members, which may consist of non-member states, regional organizations, or UN member states not currently serving on the Council. Although these observers do not have voting rights, they may be invited to participate under Article 31 or Article 32 of the UN Charter when their interests are directly affected by matters under discussion.²⁵⁸

Observer participation is a key feature of inclusive multilateral diplomacy within the UN system. These states or organizations may offer statements, provide regional insights, and lobby for specific outcomes, thereby contributing to the broader legitimacy and political weight of the Council's deliberations. However, their interventions are subject to procedural approval and do not carry formal decision-making power.

4.1 THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) is a nation marked by a rich yet tumultuous history, where deep-rooted tribal traditions intersect with geopolitical rivalries. Known for its rugged terrain and diverse ethnic composition, the country has long served as a crossroads for empires and ideologies. In the late 20th century, Afghanistan entered a period of intense political upheaval, particularly following the 1978 Saur Revolution, which ushered in a Marxist-Leninist regime under the DRA. This era was defined by radical reforms, internal resistance, and most important in this case: foreign intervention, marked by the Soviet military presence, which transformed the nation's internal struggles into a focal point of Cold War tensions.

The early days of the Soviet intervention left the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) at a moment of profound international scrutiny and internal upheaval. The country, with a long and complex history of tribal politics, regional rivalries, and great power interests, has, since 1978, undergone rapid political transformation following the Saur Revolution. This revolutionary movement, which unfolded in Afghanistan in April 1978, marked a radical

²⁵⁸DEUTSCHE WELLE. **O espião comunista que derrubou Willy Brandt**. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/pt-br/como-um-espi%C3%A3o-comunista-derrubou-o-chanceler-willy-brandt/a-16762631>. Accessed May 27th, 2025.

turning point in the country's modern history, initiating a period of profound political turmoil and foreign entanglement.²⁵⁹²⁶⁰

Named after the second month of the Afghan calendar – Saur –, the revolution was not a mass movement but rather a swift military coup orchestrated by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a Marxist-Leninist party that had operated in opposition since the late 1960s. The overthrow of President Mohammed Daoud Khan, a former prince who had himself come to power via a coup in 1973, was both violent and decisive. Within days, Daoud and much of his family were executed, and the Revolutionary Council, composed of PDPA leaders, proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.²⁶¹

The ideological roots of the revolution lay in the PDPA's commitment to socialism and its alignment with international communist movements, particularly the Soviet Union. The government-initiated land reforms, banned bride prices, promoted female education, and launched a campaign to secularize Afghan society.

While these reforms aligned with progressive ideals in theory, in practice they were implemented without regard for the deeply rooted tribal, religious, and local power structures that underpinned Afghan society. The revolutionary government's lack of cultural sensitivity and its reliance on coercion to enforce reforms generated widespread resistance, particularly in rural areas. Thousands of clerics, tribal leaders, and perceived counter-revolutionaries were arrested or executed, and insurgencies began to erupt across the countryside by the end of 1978.²⁶²

Amid increasing domestic opposition and factionalism within the ruling party, the Afghan government requested assistance from its longstanding ally, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In December 1979, in response to this request and to ensure regional stability and the continuation of the socialist project in Afghanistan, Soviet troops entered the country. The leadership of the PDPA was reorganized, as the former head of State was executed by Soviet forces, with Babrak Karmal assuming the position, supported by the USSR.²⁶³

While this intervention was framed by the Afghan government as a legitimate act of solidarity and mutual assistance between sovereign nations, it was quickly condemned by many

²⁵⁹GRAHAM, Malbone W. **The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Retrospective**. *International Affairs*, v. 56, n. 2, p. 201-220, 1980.

²⁶⁰KAMEL, Lorenzo. **Afghanistan: A Modern History**. London: Oxford University Press, 2018.

²⁶¹RUBIN, Barnett R. **The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System**. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

²⁶²*Ibidem*.

²⁶³HALLIDAY, Fred. **The USSR and the Afghan Revolution**. *Third World Quarterly*, v. 1, n. 4, p. 1-17, 1980.

Western and non-aligned states as a breach of Afghan sovereignty and a violation of international law.²⁶⁴

In the international context of the time, the Afghan Government, composed of the Soviet-backed Karmal rule, adopted a firm yet diplomatic posture. Its primary objective was the assertion and defense of the sovereignty of the DRA, along with the rejection of any characterization of the Soviet presence as an occupation.

The government emphasized that Afghanistan, like any sovereign state, had the right to seek military assistance in response to foreign-supported insurgencies that threatened its constitutional order and national security. In doing so, the regime portrayed itself not as a puppet State, but as the legitimate authority striving for national unity, modernization, and peace amid foreign interference.²⁶⁵

Kabul's representatives at the time framed the conflict as one driven by external forces – including the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the People's Republic of China – that were backing armed resistance groups (the mujahideen) and thereby destabilizing the country and obstructing efforts at internal reconciliation. The country also maintained that such international criticisms were politically motivated efforts to contain socialism and manipulate regional geopolitics under the pretext of upholding international law.²⁶⁶

On the international espionage and covert operations side, the DRA viewed these matters not only as threats to its internal security but as acts of aggression that justified increased dependence on Soviet intelligence and military assistance. Under Babrak Karmal, who came to power with direct Soviet military and political backing, Afghan counterintelligence efforts were deeply intertwined with the KGB and GRU (*Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye* – Main Intelligence Directorate), both of which operated openly and extensively within Afghanistan.

Afghan intelligence services, especially KhAD (Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati), became notorious for widespread surveillance, political repression, and collaboration with Soviet operatives in targeting dissidents and suspected foreign agents. Espionage, in this context, was not only a foreign threat but a domestic pretext for crushing opposition, and thousands of Afghans were imprisoned, tortured, or executed under the charge of being informants or collaborators with foreign intelligence.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ROY, Olivier. **Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

²⁶⁵RUBIN, Barnett R. **The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System**. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

²⁶⁶*Ibidem*.

²⁶⁷ARNOLD, Anthony. **Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective**. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985.

Despite its official condemnation of espionage, the Afghan regime was also indirectly engaged in forms of covert warfare, albeit through its reliance on Soviet methods and resources. The DRA's operations against cross-border mujahideen camps and infiltration networks—often based in Pakistan's tribal areas—represented attempts to counteract clandestine incursions and sabotage. While the DRA lacked the capacity to conduct sustained external espionage independently, it increasingly framed its domestic repression as part of a broader struggle against international subversion, thereby legitimizing its own authoritarian practices under the guise of national security.²⁶⁸

In the end, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's experience during the Soviet intervention reflects the broader complexities of Cold War geopolitics, where ideological ambitions clashed with entrenched local dynamics. While the regime sought to portray itself as a sovereign government defending its constitutional order against foreign-backed insurgencies, its heavy dependence on Soviet military and intelligence support, along with repressive domestic measures, undermined its legitimacy. The interplay between international influence and internal resistance ultimately positioned Afghanistan as both a battlefield of global ideologies and a nation struggling to assert its own identity amidst external and internal turmoil.

4.2 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

Angola - officially known at the time as the People's Republic of Angola - became a member of the United Nations on December 1st, 1976. Its admission marked a significant moment in the context of post-colonial African politics, following years of struggle for independence and the unfolding dynamics of the Cold War.²⁶⁹

Regarding covert activities, during the Cold War, Angola became a significant battleground for espionage and proxy warfare between the US and the Soviet Union, with both nations supporting different factions vying for control. The US supported groups like the FNLA - National Liberation Front of Angola and UNITA - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, while the Soviet Union backed the MPLA - People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁶⁹ UNITED NATIONS. **Member States**. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states>. Accessed on: May 28th, 2025.

²⁷⁰ FRANCE 24. **Soviet spies in Africa: How the KGB expanded Russian influence during the Cold War**. Retrieved from: <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230720-soviet-spies-in-africa-how-the-kgb-expanded-russian-influence-during-the-cold-war>. Accessed on: May 28th, 2025.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union were deeply involved in covert operations and intelligence agencies in Angola, using espionage as a tool to shape the course of the conflict. Through undercover missions, the United States of America and the Soviet Union sought to gather strategic information and sway political developments. These shadow operations became a defining feature of the broader Cold War rivalry playing out across the African continent.²⁷¹

Regarding the vision of Angola in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, due to being a soviet proxy, especially considering that the government of Angola, more specifically the MPLA, was funded by the Soviet Union, which provided not only resources, but even soldiers due to the historical events that Angola was facing from the 1960's to 1975. The Angola government had a proximity to and was on the side of the Soviet Union, even though it was not a consensus on the whole country.²⁷²

Shortly after gaining independence, it quickly became a Cold War hotspot. The US and Soviet Union backed opposing factions - UNITA and FNLA for the US, MPLA for the USSR - turning the country into a stage for proxy warfare and espionage. Both superpowers conducted covert operations and intelligence missions to sway political outcomes. Angola's Soviet-backed government supported the USSR's global stance, including the invasion of Afghanistan. However, this alignment wasn't universally accepted within the country. The conflict left Angola deeply divided and heavily impacted by foreign influence.²⁷³

4.3 THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

During the Cold War, Cuba emerged as a pivotal player in espionage and covert operations, leveraging its geographic proximity to the United States and its ideological alignment with the Soviet Union. Following the Cuban Revolution in 1959,²⁷⁴ Fidel Castro's government quickly established a robust intelligence apparatus that became one of the most effective and influential in the developing world. These efforts were instrumental in consolidating the revolutionary regime and extending its influence internationally.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ELECTRONIC READING ROOM. **Cia's secret war in Angola.** Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88-01314r000100660020-1>. Accessed on: May 28th, 2025.

²⁷² NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER. **Worldwide Reaction to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.** Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81B00401R000600190013-5.pdf>. Accessed on: May 28th, 2025.

²⁷³ *Ibidem.*

²⁷⁴ JONES, Melanie. **Cuba: History**, Jacqueline ed. South America, Central America and the Caribbean 2002. Routledge. p. 303. 2001. Retrieved from: ISBN 978-1-85743-121-6. Archived. Accessed on: May 16th, 2025.

²⁷⁵ JONES, Melanie. **Cuba: History**, Jacqueline ed. South America, Central America and the Caribbean 2002. Routledge. p. 303. 2001. Retrieved from: ISBN 978-1-85743-121-6. Archived. Accessed on: May 16th, 2025.

After the revolution, the Cuban government prioritized the establishment of an intelligence system to safeguard the regime from internal dissent and external threats. The *Dirección General de Inteligencia* (DGI), founded in the early 1960s, became the primary agency responsible for both domestic security and foreign intelligence.²⁷⁶²⁷⁷

Being heavily influenced by and modeled on the Soviet KGB, the DGI benefited from extensive training programs in Moscow. Its initial objectives centered on counterintelligence, identifying and neutralizing domestic threats such as anti-Castro groups and U.S.-backed opposition movements, as well as gathering intelligence on American military, political, and economic operations. Additionally, the DGI actively promoted international revolution by supporting leftist insurgencies and revolutionary movements, in alignment with Castro's vision of spreading socialism.²⁷⁸

Cuba's proximity to the United States allowed it to establish extensive espionage networks aimed at gathering strategic intelligence. The country's agents infiltrated various U.S. organizations, including government agencies, exile groups, and universities, providing Havana with critical information on American policy and military plans.²⁷⁹ The Cuban government also closely monitored anti-Castro exile groups based in Miami and other U.S. cities, disrupting their plans to overthrow the regime. Furthermore, through its alliance with the Soviet Union, Cuba shared intelligence on U.S. activities, significantly contributing to Soviet strategies during key Cold War moments, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.²⁸⁰

Cuba's intelligence efforts extended beyond its borders to support revolutionary causes in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The DGI played a key role in aiding guerrilla movements in countries such as Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Venezuela, providing training, funding and arms.²⁸¹ In Africa, Cuba supported liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, with Cuban advisors and operatives offering strategic guidance and military

²⁷⁶*Ibidem.*

²⁷⁷AMUCHASTEGUI, D. **Cuban intelligence and the October crisis.** *Intelligence and National Security*, 13(3), 88–119. 1988. Retrieved from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02684529808432495>. Accessed on: May 16th, 2025.

²⁷⁸*Ibidem.*

²⁷⁹HUSSAIN, Aiyaz. **Covert Action and US Cold War Strategy in Cuba, 1961–62.** *Cold War History*, 5(1), 23–53. 2005. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1468274042000283135>. Accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

²⁸⁰WELDES, Jutta. **Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis.** First edition ed., Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press. 1999. Retrieved from: <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/31690>. Accessed on: May 14th, 2025.

²⁸¹AMUCHASTEGUI, D. **Cuban intelligence and the October crisis.** *Intelligence and National Security*, 13(3), 88–119. 1988. Retrieved from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02684529808432495>. Accessed on: May 16th, 2025.

training. One of the most symbolic examples of Cuban covert operations was Che Guevara's mission to foment revolution in Congo and later in Bolivia.²⁸²

The alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union significantly bolstered the country's intelligence capabilities. The KGB provided extensive training to Cuban intelligence officers, enhancing their ability to conduct complex operations. These nation's intelligence agencies collaborated on various activities, including monitoring U.S. military movements and influencing political developments in third countries. This partnership allowed the Republic of Cuba to play an outsized role in Cold War geopolitics, acting as a proxy for Soviet interests in the Western Hemisphere and beyond.²⁸³

Within Cuba, the intelligence apparatus focused on maintaining internal security and suppressing dissent. The government conducted extensive surveillance of its population, targeting dissidents, intellectuals, and suspected counter-revolutionaries. Domestic networks of anti-Castro activists were dismantled through arrests, infiltration, and propaganda campaigns. The Cuban regime also utilized the media to discredit opposition figures and promote the narrative of a united revolutionary state.^{284/285}

By the late 1970s, Cuba had established itself as a key player in global espionage, with an intelligence network that extended across continents. While continuing to support revolutionary movements, Cuba began adapting to new geopolitical realities, including the emergence of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite economic hardships and increasing U.S. sanctions, Cuba's intelligence capabilities remained robust, with operations spanning multiple regions and demonstrating significant resilience and adaptability. This ensured Cuba's continued relevance and effectiveness as a player in Cold War geopolitics.²⁸⁶

Cuba's engagement in espionage and covert operations during the Cold War, particularly up to 1979, was a critical component of its strategy to defend the revolution and promote socialism. Through its alliance with the Soviet Union and its support for global revolutionary movements, Cuba positioned itself as a formidable player in the international

²⁸²HARMER, Tanya. **Two, Three, Many Revolutions? Cuba and the Prospects for Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1967–1975.** *Journal of Latin American Studies* 45, no. 1. 2013. p. 61–89. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X1200123X>. Accessed on: May 16th, 2025.

²⁸³AMUCHASTEGUI, D. *Op. Cit.*

²⁸⁴*Ibidem.*

²⁸⁵HARMER, Tanya. *Op. Cit.*

²⁸⁶AMUCHASTEGUI, D. **Cuban intelligence and the October crisis.** *Intelligence and National Security*, 13(3), 88–119. 1988. Retrieved from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02684529808432495>. Accessed on: May 16th, 2025.

intelligence arena. These efforts not only solidified Castro's regime but also influenced Cold War dynamics, leaving a lasting legacy in the history of global espionage.²⁸⁷

When it comes to Cuba's stance on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it was shaped by its dual role as a Soviet ally and a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The invasion marked a significant moment in Cold War history, as the USSR sought to support a faltering pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan against insurgent forces. For Cuba, this development presented both opportunities and challenges in balancing its geopolitical and ideological commitments.²⁸⁸

Historically, Cuba had been a staunch ally of the Soviet Union since the Cuban Revolution of 1959. This alliance provided Havana with crucial economic aid, military support, and political backing, enabling Fidel Castro's government to withstand U.S. pressures and maintain its revolutionary agenda. Consequently, Cuba's initial response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was supportive. The Cuban government echoed the USSR's justification for the intervention, portraying it as a defensive measure necessary to counter imperialist interference and stabilize a socialist government under threat from reactionary forces.²⁸⁹

However, Cuba's leadership in the NAM complicated its position. As chair of the organization in 1979, Cuba was tasked with representing the interests of nations that sought to avoid alignment with either of the Cold War superpowers. Many NAM member states, particularly those in the Global South, criticized the Soviet invasion as an act of aggression that violated Afghanistan's sovereignty and risked further destabilizing the region. To maintain its credibility within the NAM, Cuba adopted a more measured stance, emphasizing principles such as non-intervention, sovereignty, and the need for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.²⁹⁰

Cuban diplomats navigated this delicate situation by framing the Afghan crisis within a broader critique of imperialism and foreign intervention. While refraining from directly condemning the Soviet Union, they avoided explicitly endorsing the invasion, instead calling for dialogue and respect for Afghanistan's independence. This approach allowed Cuba to

²⁸⁷HARMER, Tanya. **Two, Three, Many Revolutions? Cuba and the Prospects for Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1967–1975.** *Journal of Latin American Studies* 45, no. 1. 2013. p. 61–89. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X1200123X>. Accessed on: May 16th, 2025.

²⁸⁸BAIN, M. J. **Soviet-cuban relations, 1985 to 1991: changing perceptions in Moscow and Havana.** Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2007.

²⁸⁹*Ibidem.*

²⁹⁰BLASIER, Cole. **Cuba in the world.** University of Pittsburgh Press. 1^o Ed. Pittsburgh. 1979. Retrieved from: <https://www.amazon.com.br/Cuba-World-Cole-Blasier/dp/082295298X>. Accessed on: May 16th, 2025.

preserve its strategic partnership with Moscow while mitigating tensions with NAM members who were wary of superpower dominance.²⁹¹

Cuba's political calculations during this period were also influenced by its broader foreign policy objectives. As a revolutionary state committed to supporting global socialism, it viewed the survival of socialist regimes, including Afghanistan's, as essential to the broader struggle against capitalist hegemony. At the same time, its leadership in the NAM provided an avenue to expand its diplomatic influence and strengthen ties with countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.^{292/293}

In summary, the Republic of Cuba's stance on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 reflected its intertwined geopolitical and historical contexts. The country's alignment with the Soviet Union ensured its general support for the intervention, while its leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement demanded a nuanced and balanced approach. By emphasizing principles of sovereignty and peaceful resolution, Cuba sought to navigate the complexities of Cold War politics, reinforcing its position as both a loyal Soviet ally and a champion of non-aligned solidarity. This delicate balancing act underscored Cuba's ability to adapt to shifting international dynamics while maintaining its revolutionary ethos.

4.4 THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The State of Israel, a relatively young nation, was established just over three decades earlier in 1948.²⁹⁴ Located in the Middle East, Israel shares borders with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, and has a coastline along the Mediterranean Sea to the west. It has a population of roughly 3,786,000 people,²⁹⁵ and in recent years has experienced ongoing tensions with neighboring Arab countries — such as the Six-Day War in 1967, during which it captured the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt.²⁹⁶ This territory was eventually returned in 1978

²⁹¹Bain, M. J. *Soviet-cuban relations, 1985 to 1991: changing perceptions in Moscow and Havana*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2007.

²⁹²*Ibidem*.

²⁹³HARMER, Tanya. **Two, Three, Many Revolutions? Cuba and the Prospects for Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1967–1975**. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 45, no. 1. 2013. p. 61–89. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X1200123X>. Accessed on: May 16th, 2025.

²⁹⁴OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN. **Creation of Israel, 1948**. Retrieved from: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/creation-israel>. May 31st 2025.

²⁹⁵COUNTRY ECONOMY. **Israel - Population**. Retrieved from: <https://countryeconomy.com/demography/population/israel?year=1979>. Accessed May 31st 2025.

²⁹⁶The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. **Six-Day War**. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, May 29th. 2025, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War>. Accessed May 31st 2025.

following the signing of the Camp David Accords, which marked the first peace treaty between Israel and one of its neighboring Arab states.²⁹⁷

The State of Israel has had a long history with espionage. During the British mandate in Palestine, the Haganah – the main Zionist paramilitary organization that operated for the Yishuv²⁹⁸ – had its own intelligence branch,²⁹⁹ which soon after the founding of the State would give origin to the *Ha-Mosad le-Modi'in u-le-Tafkidim Meyuḥadim*, also known as Mossad, in 1949.³⁰⁰

The new agency was hampered by bureaucratic conflicts in its early days, however, having taken over a year to become fully operational.³⁰¹ It also suffered from the discovery of an Israeli spy ring in 1951 Baghdad, where some of its intelligence officers were arrested. As the first agency director Reuven Shiloah stepped out, the former head of the Shin Bet, Isser Harel, stepped in. He was credited with then transforming the Mossad into a highly professional organization, capable of conducting operations all around the globe.³⁰²

One such operation was that of the capture of notorious nazi Adolf Eichmann who, at the time, resided in Argentina, and his subsequent exfiltration to Israel to stand trial for war crimes. This high-profile capture served as a way to show the world Mossad's proficiency and confidence in high-risk operations.³⁰³ Throughout the years, Israel has maintained and still maintains numerous Israeli secret agents in multiple Arab (and other) nations.³⁰⁴

In September of 1972, eleven Israeli athletes were murdered at the Munich Olympic Games by Black September, a terrorist group affiliated with Fatah. Mossad would then proceed to track down and assassinate the Arab guerrilla leaders responsible for the massacre – later on, the agency would also be linked to several assassinations of Palestinian leaders in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.³⁰⁵

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Israel stood alongside the Western Bloc in support of the Afghan mujahideens. The Israelis interpreted the events in Afghanistan as

²⁹⁷Carter, Jimmy. **Camp David Accords**. Encyclopedia Britannica, 14 Apr. 2025, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Camp-David-Accords>. Accessed May 31th 2025.

²⁹⁸Jews living in British-mandate Palestine.

²⁹⁹Washington Robnett, George (1976). **Zionist Rape of the Holy Land!: How Zionism Turned Palestine Into a Jewish State**. Crown City Publishing Company, p. 169.

³⁰⁰ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA. **Mossad**. Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Mossad>. Accessed on: March 29, 2025.

³⁰¹*Ibidem*.

³⁰²*Ibidem*.

³⁰³*Ibidem*.

³⁰⁴*Ibidem*.

³⁰⁵*Ibidem*.

support for their longstanding contention that the central destabilizing factor in the region was not the Arab-Israeli conflict, but instead a combination of Soviet expansionism, growing domestic instability in the nearing Muslim states, and the Islamic revival.³⁰⁶ Given its perception of rapidly worsening regional instability, the state's government was even less willing to consider major concessions on Palestinian autonomy. Instead, it would increasingly emphasize the critical "larger" need for cooperation on regional security among the United States, Egypt, and Israel.³⁰⁷

All throughout its history, Israel has severely depended on its intelligence agency, both for small and high-profile operations. On multiple occasions, Mossad would serve as a means to reinstate its authority internationally, be it through the capture of criminals without the aid of the countries in which they resided³⁰⁸ or in the persecution of those who opposed the existence of the state. Therefore, Israel sees intelligence as a means to strengthen its country, something that can be considered very important when it has multiple unwelcoming neighbours. As a vocal supporter of the West, Israel would eventually help train and arm those who would fight against the Soviets and the Afghan government.

4.5 THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a country located in the southwestern region of Asia. It has a population of approximately 78,997,039 people³⁰⁹ and shares borders with India, China, Iran, and Afghanistan — the latter being separated by what is known as the Durand Line.³¹⁰

This 2,600-kilometer-long frontier with Afghanistan — Pakistan's second-longest boundary, only after its border with India —³¹¹ has long served as one of the region's primary migration corridors. Since before the Soviet invasion, ongoing political instability in Afghanistan had already driven waves of displacement. By November 1979, Pakistan had granted asylum to approximately 386,916 Afghan refugees, triggering a massive humanitarian

³⁰⁶ UNITED STATES. **WORLDWIDE REACTION TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN**. Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81B00401R000600190013-5.pdf>. Accessed on: March 29, 2025.

³⁰⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁰⁸ BASCOMB, Neal. **The Nazi Hunters: How a Team of Spies and Survivors Captured the World's Most Notorious Nazi**. 2013.

³⁰⁹ COUNTRY ECONOMY. **Pakistan - Population**. Retrieved from: <https://countryeconomy.com/demography/population/pakistan?year=1979>. Accessed May 21th 2025

³¹⁰ RAIKAR, Sanat Pai. **Durand Line**. Encyclopedia Britannica, 10 Apr. 2025, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Durand-Line>. Accessed May 27th 2025.

³¹¹ *ibidem*

crisis as the country struggled to provide adequate support to the immense influx of immigrants.³¹²

As a member of the Non-Aligned Movement³¹³, Pakistan is not formally aligned with either NATO³¹⁴ or the Warsaw Pact³¹⁵. However, its position has not been one of complete neutrality, as the country has historically maintained strategic ties with the West,³¹⁶ and might adopt a critical stance against the Soviet invasion.³¹⁷

On its eastern front, since gaining independence from the British Empire in 1947, Pakistan has been locked in a territorial conflict with India over the Kashmir region. This rivalry has led to two full-scale wars, in 1965 and 1971, and the territory remains divided between the two nations by the Line of Control.³¹⁸ In the aftermath, India's first nuclear test, code named "Smiling Buddha",³¹⁹ prompted Pakistan to accelerate its own nuclear weapons program, building upon an existing civilian nuclear energy research infrastructure that had been initially supported by the United States for peaceful purposes.³²⁰

In regard to espionage activities, Pakistan has three main intelligence agencies: the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which focuses on domestic and political affairs; Military Intelligence (MI), which handles counterinsurgency operations; and the Inter-Services

³¹² CHEEMA, Pervaiz Iqbal. **IMPACT OF THE AFGHAN WAR ON PAKISTAN**. Pakistan Horizon, vol. 41, no. 1, 1988, pp. 23–45. JSTOR. Retrieved from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394475>. Accessed May 25th 2025.

³¹³ The Non-Aligned Movement is a group of countries that chose not to align with either the U.S. or the USSR during the Cold War. Founded in 1961, it promotes independence, neutrality, and peaceful coexistence. It mainly consists of developing nations and countries that recently achieved their sovereignty.

³¹⁴ NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is a military alliance founded in 1949 for collective defense, where an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. It includes the U.S., Canada, and various European countries.

³¹⁵ The Warsaw Treaty Organization (also known as the Warsaw Pact) was a political and military alliance established on May 14, 1955 between the Soviet Union and several Eastern European countries. Retrieved from: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/warsaw-treaty>. Accessed on: March 1st, 2025.

³¹⁶ ALI, Ishfaq & ANWAR, Muhammad Fiaz. **Pak-US Relations: An Overview in Historical Perspective (1947-2021)**. Pakistan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Volume 11, Number 04, 2023. Retrieved from: <https://journals.internationalrasd.org/index.php/pjhss/article/download/1913/1268/10479>. Accessed May 28th 2025.

³¹⁷ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. **Worldwide Reaction to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan**. Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81B00401R000600190013-5.pdf>. Accessed May 22nd 2025.

³¹⁸ The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. **Kashmir**. Encyclopedia Britannica, 21 May 2025. Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>. Accessed May 21st 2025.

³¹⁹ BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION. **SMILING BUDDHA: INDIA'S FIRST NUCLEAR TEST**. Retrieved from: <https://bbc.com/audio/play/w3cswsqn>. Accessed May 28th 2025.

³²⁰ NORRIS, Robert S. & COCHRAN, Thomas B. **Pakistan in nuclear weapon in The spread of nuclear weapons**. Encyclopedia Britannica, 21 May. 2025, Retrieved from: <https://www.britannica.com/technology/nuclear-weapon/Pakistan>. Accessed May 28th 2025

Intelligence (ISI), which is responsible for both foreign and internal intelligence gathering, as well as covert and offensive operations.³²¹

The ISI evolved into what some describe as a "state within a state" as it operates with significant autonomy, it is not directly accountable to the military and lacks real effective supervision. It is arguably the most powerful institution within the Pakistani government.³²² The agency is structured into seven main branches, covering areas such as political surveillance, counterintelligence, wartime espionage, and special operations in the Kashmir region, while also supposedly containing a specialized division focused on explosives and chemical warfare, although little public information is available about its activities.³²³

Approved in 1979, the CIA began a partnership with the ISI aimed at training and arming Afghan mujahideen.³²⁴ The Pakistani agency played a key role in the operation, being responsible for much of the on-the-ground training and weapons distribution.³²⁵

In conclusion, Pakistan — being directly affected by the Soviet invasion — emerged as one of the most active nations in response to the conflict. Its strategic alignment with the West has reshaped regional dynamics, while rising tensions with its Indian neighbor have further motivated the country to modernize its military in preparation for potential future conflicts. In the realm of espionage, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has proven highly effective in intelligence gathering, with the capacity to significantly influence both domestic and foreign affairs, as well as the trajectory of the Afghan war.

4.6 THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was officially founded in 1932 by Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, through the unification of the Arabian Peninsula. However, the region's history dates back throughout many millennia. Prior, the region was a patchwork of tribal territories, with the most prominent being the Nejd and the Hejaz. The establishment of the nation under a singular

³²¹ WIKILEAKS. **Pakistani Intelligence Research**. Released on 15 Sep. 2013. Retrieved from: https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/63/63552_pakistani-intelligence-research-.html. Accessed May 28th 2025

³²² *ibidem*

³²³ SOUTH ASIA TERRORISM PORTAL. **Structure of ISI**. Retrieved from: https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/papers/Structure_of_ISI.htm. Accessed May 28th 2025

³²⁴ OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN. **76. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting**. Retrieved from: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v12/d76>. Accessed May 28th 2025

³²⁵ ULLAH, Azmat & SULTANA, Razia. (2023). **The Role of Foreign Actors in Afghanistan, 1978-1992**. Central Asia. 66. 2010. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374535341_The_Role_of_Foreign_Actors_in_Afghanistan_1978-1992. Accessed May 28th 2025.

government marked the rise of a powerful state centered on Islam, particularly as the guardian of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, upholding significant cultural and political value among the Muslim and Arab countries.³²⁶

During the Cold War, the Arab world was primarily marked by the ongoing tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, in their quest for supremacy within the region, as their rivalry dates back many centuries.³²⁷ Their rivalry is strongly related to religion, due to the ongoing hostility between Shias and Sunnis³²⁸ over the succession in Islam since the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE.³²⁹ Thus, the tense relationship between these nations was only fumed by the Cold War. Lastly, it is important to regard that in the Arab world the more influence you have over Islam the more influence you have over the Islamic countries.

First and foremost, espionage and secret intelligence gathering marked the period. However, in the Arab countries, covert activities had begun during World War II, being overseen by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the CIA.³³⁰ At the time, there were many ongoing operations, and by the end of the war, the OSS had established an intelligence network in the Middle East comprising more than five hundred agents, and operating across all countries in the region with the sole exception of Saudi Arabia.³³¹

Saudi's relations with the concept of covert operations drastically changed in 1964, when Crown Prince Faisal ascended to the throne. One of his first actions in power was to assign his close confidant, Kamal Adham, to lead Saudi Arabia's newly established General Intelligence Directorate (GID).³³² The kingdom's secret intelligence rapidly formed a close alliance with the CIA, as noted by British journalist Peter Holden, and it is suggested that together, they had organised secret operations in Arab countries such as Yemen.³³³

³²⁶AL-RASHEED, Madawi. **A History of Saudi Arabia**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

³²⁷HIRO, Dilip. **Cold War in the Islamic World: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Struggle for Supremacy**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

³²⁸Sunnis and Shiites split over who should lead after Muhammad's death: Sunnis favored Abu Bakr, while Shiites believed leadership belonged to Ali and his descendants. Some cultural differences that can be highlighted are that Shiites venerate imams with spiritual authority, unlike Sunnis who emphasize community consensus. Shiites commemorate Ashura (martyrdom of Hussein) intensely, while Sunnis do not. Shiites form a minority (10–15%) and are concentrated in Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain. Lastly, Sunnis generally separate religious leadership from political rule, though in history they often intertwined while Shiites have a closer link between spiritual leadership and political legitimacy, especially through the concept of the imamate. (ARMANIOS, Febe. **Islam: Sunnis and Shiites**. CRS Report for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2004)

³²⁹HIRO, Dilip. *Op Cit*.

³³⁰LITTLE, Douglas. **Mission impossible: the CIA and the cult of covert action in the Middle East**.

³³¹*ibidem*

³³²LITTLE, Douglas. *Op Cit*.

³³³LITTLE, Douglas. *Op Cit*.

Their influence in espionage during the cold war is highlighted by the creation of the “Safari Club”. This coalition was formed by a group of nations, among them Saudi Arabia, Iran, Morocco and Egypt, which conducted secret operations across Africa during a period when the USA Congress had restricted the CIA’s activities due to its history of misconduct.³³⁴ The “Club” is described as being a group of conservative Middle Eastern and African States, and their main goal was to block the spread of Soviet influence in the region.³³⁵

Subsequently, Saudi’s influence in the Cold War can not be resumed only for their covert activities, as they held much power over political and regional conflicts in the Arab nations.³³⁶ One instance that can be highlighted is their role during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as the country was one its major actors. This occurred due to the nation’s leadership role in the protection and spread of Islam the 1970’s, and, therefore held major power over the devout Afghans.³³⁷

However, the religious factor was not the only interest keeping Saudi Arabia close to the conflict. Overall, they were concerned with a potential shift in the established order of the Middle East and possible changes in the regional power dynamics. Those fears were partly triggered by the situation in Afghanistan, following the April 1978 Revolution, when the new regime embraced socialist principles and began implementing policies aimed at reducing the role of Islam.³³⁸

A pivotal factor to consider in their involvement in a possible invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets was the closeness between Ryad and Washington, as the nation aimed to stay close allies to the USA during the period. Also, the Kingdom was going through its own national crisis, as in the late 1970 the royal council began “to feel pressure from nonroyal sources” since young military men were questioning the royal rule.³³⁹

In 1979, a group of young religious extremists, not pleased with the current ruling, with the goal of “purifying Islam and liberating Saudi Arabia from the royal family”, attacked the holy Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia. Such action made it clear to the Saudi royal family

³³⁴MAZZETTI, Mark; APUZZO, Matt. **The US relies heavily on Saudi money to support Syrian rebels.** *New York Times*, n. 23, 2016.

³³⁵MIGLIETTA, John P. **American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.** Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002.

³³⁶RABUSH, Taisiya V. **Involvement of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the events in Afghanistan in the late 1970s.** *Vestnik Volgogradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Serii 4, Istoriia, Regionovedenie, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia*, v. 26, n. 1, 2021.

³³⁷*ibidem*

³³⁸*Op Cit.* RABUSH, Taisiya V.

³³⁹PETROV-YOO, Adelaide. **Explaining America's Proxy War in Afghanistan: US Relations with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia 1979–1989.** 2019. Tese (Doutorado) – Clark University.

that deeply devout Muslims were dissatisfied with the current state of affairs.³⁴⁰ This prompted the monarchy to reconsider and adjust its policies in order to address this emerging Islamic challenge to its authority. Therefore, by the time Afhegan was invaded by the Soviets, the Saudis were looking for security and alliance.³⁴¹

In conclusion, Saudi Arabia's emergence as a significant Islamic and political actor in the Arab world was not just a result of its religious heritage and historical role as the protector of Mecca and Medina, but also due to its dynamic involvement in Cold War-era geopolitics. The kingdom's shift towards covert operations under Faisal's reign, its active intelligence collaborations, and its leading role in initiatives like the Safari Club highlight its growing influence in the Middle East. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia's participation in supporting Afghan resistance underscored its dual motivation: to curb Soviet influence and to preserve its religious and political hegemony. This multifaceted strategy reinforced Saudi Arabia's stature as a key player in shaping regional stability and Islamic identity during a tumultuous period.

4.7 THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa - officially the Republic of South Africa - is one of the original 51 Founding Members of the United Nations that signed the UN Charter on June 26, 1945.³⁴² South Africa, among all the African Continent, has not been granted a permanent seat at the United Nations Council.³⁴³ The Republic of South Africa was known as the Union of South Africa until the year of 1961.

In matters of espionage, it is clear that South Africa's territory and population were a victim of both countries - Soviet Union and United States of America. Especially during the Cold War, South Africa became a key battleground for intelligence operations. Warsaw Pact agencies were deeply engaged in efforts to destabilize the apartheid regime in Pretoria, support the conflict in Angola, and assist various Communist, anti-colonial, and national liberation movements throughout the African continent.

South Africa's nuclear activities were also under surveillance from the soviets. In 1977, satellite imagery alerted the Soviets to signs of a planned nuclear test in the Kalahari

³⁴⁰PETROV-YOO, Adelaide. **Explaining America's Proxy War in Afghanistan: US Relations with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia 1979–1989**. 2019. Tese (Doutorado) – Clark University.

³⁴¹*Ibidem*.

³⁴²UNITED NATIONS. **Members States**. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states>. Accessed on: May 22th, 2025.

³⁴³POLICY CENTER FOR THE NEW SOUTH. **Africa is Still not a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council: Why it is Time to Act**. Retrieved from: <https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/africa-still-not-permanent-member-un-security-council-why-it-time-act>. Accessed on: May 22th, 2025.

Desert. This intelligence was corroborated by a South African naval officer secretly passing information to Russian military intelligence. The Soviets subsequently informed the White House.

The United States perspective surrounding the participation of South Africa in some of the Cold War related conflicts was polemic. The fear of another communist country after what happened in Vietnam, the U.S. encouraged South Africa to intervene in Angola, promising support. In response, South Africa sent troops to aid anti-communist groups FNLA and UNITA and invaded Angola.³⁴⁴

The Soviet Union's viewpoint on South Africa's involvement in some of the Cold War related conflicts - especially in the African continent - was the recognition of three main groups in the global revolutionary movement: countries with communist revolutions, the Western working class, and Third World nations fighting imperialism.³⁴⁵

The USSR supported anti-apartheid efforts in South Africa as part of this third group, seeing it as a way to weaken Western influence. However, the USSR's main strategic focus remained on its borders and relations with the West. It was evident that Southern Africa's resources and sea routes were not major priorities to the USSR. Furthermore, Soviet officials rejected the idea that their actions in the region were part of the Cold War.³⁴⁶

It is clear that South Africa strongly opposed the invasion, as it seems that the country received funds from the United States of America, which secretly had a partnership - who had been severely criticized by the Soviet Union, due to the Apartheid Regime as stated above.³⁴⁷

Evidently, South Africa was deeply involved in Cold War conflicts in Southern Africa, especially in Angola. The U.S. supported South Africa's military intervention against communist forces to prevent the spread of communism, while the USSR backed anti-apartheid and liberation movements as part of its anti-imperialist strategy.

Despite being overlooked by Western countries, Southern Africa was significantly impacted by the global Cold War. The conflict had mostly negative consequences for the region. Cold War tensions influenced providing ideological support both to white-minority

³⁴⁴POLICY CENTER FOR THE NEW SOUTH. **Africa is Still not a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council: Why it is Time to Act.** Retrieved from: <https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/africa-still-not-permanent-member-un-security-council-why-it-time-act>. Accessed on: May 22th, 2025.

³⁴⁵WILSON CENTER. **Southern Africa in the Cold War, post-1974.** Retrieved from: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/CWIHP_SouthAfrica_Final_Web.pdf. Accessed on: May 23th, 2025.

³⁴⁶*Ibidem.*

³⁴⁷*Ibidem.*

governments and to liberation movements.³⁴⁸ Both the United States of America and the Soviet Union exploited the ideological rivalry for their own benefits, although it is evident that both of them had opposite goals.³⁴⁹

4.8 THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

The Socialist Federal Republic (SFR) of Yugoslavia is a Federal Republic composed of six socialist constituent republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia; and two socialist autonomous provinces within Serbia: Kosovo and Vojvodina. Spanning an area of approximately 256 thousand square kilometers, SFR Yugoslavia occupied a critical position in Central and Southeast Europe, firmly situated within the Balkans.

Governed by the President of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, the country's foreign policy was deeply rooted in the principles of non-alignment and "active peaceful coexistence".³⁵⁰ This doctrine emphasized the strengthening of international law, the promotion of peacekeeping, and the peaceful settlement of disputes through the United Nations.³⁵¹

Yugoslav legal scholars and diplomats consistently articulated a distinction between international law and foreign policy, viewing them as separate yet linked realms, in contrast to the Soviet concept which framed both as integral to the struggle for world communism.³⁵² This philosophical divergence implied an official rejection of state-sponsored espionage as a legitimate tool of international relations, at least in its overt pronouncements.

This official position, while principled, existed alongside a robust and active intelligence apparatus. The discrepancy highlights a common feature of statecraft: the diplomatic ideal of non-interference often coexists with the operational necessity of intelligence gathering and covert action for national security. Despite its public advocacy for international legal norms, Yugoslavia, like most sovereign states, engaged in intelligence activities to protect

³⁴⁸ MATTHEW GRAHAM. *Cold War in Southern Africa*. Retrieved from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798909?seq=1>. Accessed on: May 23th, 2025.

³⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁵⁰ MARTINOVIĆ, S. *Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia*. *Pakistan Horizon*, v. 36, n. 1, p. 28-31, 1983. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/41394717. Accessed on: 24 May 2025.

³⁵¹ UNITED STATES. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. **Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Soviet-Yugoslav Relations Since Tito**. Washington, D.C., 16 June 1981. In: UNITED STATES. Department of State. Office of the Historian. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2023. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v10/d193>. Accessed on: 24 May 2025.

³⁵² TRÜLTZSCH, Arno. **Non-Alignment in the United Nations and Its Impact on International Law: The Case of Yugoslavia**. [S. l.]: Wallstein, 2021. Available at: http://doi.fil.bg.ac.rs/pdf/eb_book/2021/iipe_60nam/iipe_60nam-2021-ch8.pdf. Accessed on: 24 May 2025.

its national interests, particularly given its unique geopolitical position between two powerful blocs.

Yugoslavia's primary intelligence and security agencies, the UDBA and KOS, originated from the Department for the People's Protection (OZNA), which was restructured in 1946. The UDBA, or Directorate for State Security, served as the civilian secret police. Later officially known as the State Security Service (SDB), the UDBA was widely recognized and feared as an instrument of state control, frequently accused of "eliminating" perceived enemies of the state both within Yugoslavia and internationally.³⁵³

The KOS, or Counterintelligence Service, functioned as the military security and counterintelligence arm of the Yugoslav People's Army.³⁵⁴ It was formed from OZNA's military counterintelligence section and reported to the State Secretariat of People's Defence.³⁵⁵

UDBA's primary operational focus was on domestic security, specifically identifying and obstructing the activities of the "domestic enemy".³⁵⁶ The methods employed by the agency were extensive and covert, including house searches, covert interceptions of communications (both within premises and telecommunications), covert surveillance of individuals, and the interception of letters and other consignments.³⁵⁷ While foreign intelligence work was generally considered less important and remained under federal control, the federal-level UDBA was responsible for conducting intelligence activities against neighboring Communist countries.³⁵⁸

A concrete example of their foreign intelligence operations, particularly against perceived threats from émigré communities, is the "Croatian Six" case in 1979. In February of that year, six Croatian-Australian men were accused of conspiring to bomb targets in Sydney, including a Yugoslav travel agent.³⁵⁹ Subsequent media investigations strongly suggested that much of the evidence against the men was fabricated and that they were "set up as part of a

³⁵³TRÜLTZSCH, Arno. **Non-Alignment in the United Nations and Its Impact on International Law: The Case of Yugoslavia**. [S. l.]: Wallstein, 2021. Available at:

http://doi.fil.bg.ac.rs/pdf/eb_book/2021/iipe_60nam/iipe_60nam-2021-ch8.pdf. Accessed on: 24 May 2025.

³⁵⁴ YUGOSLAVIA 6. Intelligence and Security. [S. l.]: [s.n.], [s.d.]. Available at:

<https://www.scribd.com/document/114879191/Yugoslavia-6-Intelligence-and-Security>. Accessed on: 24 May 2025.

³⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁵⁶ UNITED STATES, 1985, *op. cit.*

³⁵⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁵⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁵⁹ UZUNOV, Sasha. **Who Was The Croatian Six Mastermind?**. [S. l.]: Scoop, 2011. Available at:

<https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1107/S00270/who-was-the-croatian-six-mastermind.htm>. Accessed on: 25 May 2025.

sting operation by the Yugoslav foreign intelligence service, UDBA”.³⁶⁰ Key figures involved were identified as their operatives, and the chief witness was confirmed as an agent who had infiltrated the Croatian community in Australia.³⁶¹

Beyond internal security, Yugoslav intelligence services played a crucial role in supporting the nation’s non-aligned foreign policy. Yugoslav diplomats and intelligence services collected extensive information, which remains a valuable resource for Cold War historians.³⁶² This suggests that intelligence gathering was integral to informing and supporting Yugoslavia’s diplomatic efforts, particularly within the Non-Aligned Movement.

The intelligence apparatus, especially UDBA and KOS, was also instrumental in countering external pressures. After the break with the Soviet Union, both services combined efforts to combat pro-Stalin or pro-Soviet activities, thereby safeguarding Yugoslavia’s hard-won independence from the Eastern Bloc.³⁶³

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 presented a critical test for Yugoslavia’s non-aligned foreign policy, particularly as it coincided with a period of profound internal uncertainty regarding President Tito’s health. The country officially and strongly condemned the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, expressing “astonishment” and “deep concern” over the developments.³⁶⁴ This was a particularly significant stance because Afghanistan, like Yugoslavia, was a non-aligned and socialist country outside the Warsaw Pact.³⁶⁵

The condemnation was not merely an ideological statement against foreign intervention; it was a deeply pragmatic reaction rooted in Yugoslavia’s own geopolitical anxieties. As a founding member and a key driver of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Yugoslavia played a disproportionately influential role in Cold War diplomacy. In response to

³⁶⁰ ABC. **The Croatian Six - Part Two**. In: *The History Listen*. [S. l.]: ABC, [s.d.]. Audio program. Available at: <https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/the-history-listen/the-croatian-six---part-two/13845478>. Accessed on: 25 May 2025.

³⁶¹ *Ibidem*.

³⁶² MARTINOVIĆ, S. **Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia**. *Pakistan Horizon*, v. 36, n. 1, p. 28-31, 1983. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/41394717. Accessed on: 24 May 2025.

³⁶³ DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Bojan. **Intelligence and Security Services in Tito's Yugoslavia 1944-1966**. *Istorija 20 veka*, v. 37, n. 2/2019, p. 9-28, Aug. 2019. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334847084_Intelligence_and_Security_Services_in_Tito%27s_Yugoslavia_1944-1966. Accessed on: 25 May 2025.

³⁶⁴ UNITED STATES. Central Intelligence Agency. National Foreign Assessment Center. **Worldwide Reaction to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan**. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1980. Approved For Release 2006/11/07. Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20170123091844/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81B00401R000600190013-5.pdf>. Accessed on: 25 May 2025.

³⁶⁵ *Ibidem*.

the Afghanistan invasion, Yugoslavia insisted that the NAM organize a special ministerial meeting to condemn the Soviet intervention, an action typically reserved for Western countries.³⁶⁶

The Yugoslav approach for foreign policy called for dynamic and creative engagement in international relations, actively opposing “force politics” wherever it occurred.³⁶⁷ However, despite Yugoslavia’s efforts, internal divisions within the NAM became apparent. India was hesitant to support a strong condemnation, fearing it would strengthen the position of Pakistan and China, while Cuba, which chaired the Movement at the time, was closely aligned with the Soviet Union.³⁶⁸

These internal divisions within the NAM regarding the Afghanistan invasion revealed the movement’s inherent limitations as a unified anti-bloc force. The inability to achieve a unanimous and strong condemnation of the Soviet action demonstrated that the NAM itself was not immune to superpower influence or the differing geopolitical interests of its members. This compelled Yugoslavia to adopt a more pragmatic approach, as evidenced by its later “lower profile” on the issue, suggesting that while principled, its foreign policy also had to adapt to the realities of international power dynamics and the constraints of its multilateral platforms.

The context of Tito’s fragile health³⁶⁹ would have added an urgent layer to any action aiming to regard the preservation of Yugoslavian independence, as the invasion of a fellow non-aligned, socialist country would have been perceived as a stark warning and a potential precursor to renewed Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia itself. In this sense, the country faced an inevitable crisis due to the impending death of their unifying leader and the rise of separatists movements due to ethnic tensions.

³⁶⁶UNITED STATES. Central Intelligence Agency. National Foreign Assessment Center. **Worldwide Reaction to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan**. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1980. Approved For Release 2006/11/07. Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20170123091844/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81B00401R000600190013-5.pdf>. Accessed on: 25 May 2025.

³⁶⁷BOGETIĆ, Dragan. **Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement**. In: RAPAIĆ, Stevan; ZORIĆ, Ivan (Ed.). *Non-Alignment in a Changing World: Challenges and Prospects*. Belgrade: The Institute of International Politics and Economics, 2021. p. 175-190. Available at: http://doi.fil.bg.ac.rs/pdf/eb_book/2021/iipe_60nam/iipe_60nam-2021-ch13.pdf. Accessed on: 24 May 2025.

³⁶⁸UNITED STATES, 1980, *op. cit.*

³⁶⁹UNITED STATES, 1981, *op. cit.*

CONCLUSION

This document aims to provide a strategic perspective on the role of the United Nations Security Council in addressing the complex challenges of peace and security amid the growing prevalence of espionage and covert operations. It outlines how the committee can effectively respond to threats to global stability, particularly those targeting matters of nations sovereignty, while also recognizing the influence of surveillance tools and ideological stances that can both enable and complicate security efforts in the world. It is essential to acknowledge that the Security Council's commitment to fostering international cooperation, transparency, and a unified legal framework is critical for managing these evolving risks in the Cold War Era.

In particular, the document emphasizes the Security Council's pivotal role in maintaining global peace during the Soviet-Afghan conflict, a defining moment in Cold War history. This conflict served as a significant test for the UNSC, highlighting the challenges of balancing competing geopolitical interests while attempting to mitigate the destructive consequences of espionage, covert military operations, and ideological rivalries. The Security Council's actions during this period were marked by both limitations and opportunities to influence outcomes in a deeply polarized international landscape.

The need for proactive and cooperative measures from all UN member states, as well as strategic input from key international players, underscores the importance of a coordinated approach in addressing both state and non-state actors engaged in espionage and covert actions. These efforts, driven by collective determination, are indispensable for ensuring a lasting peace and strengthening the Security Council's role in maintaining international stability amidst the uncertainties of a world shaped by hidden conflicts and shifting alliances.

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